A VINDICATION OF Dr. HAMMONDS *Addresse*, &c.

From the Exceptions of

EUTACTUS PHILODEMIUS,

IN TWO PARTICULARS.

Concerning { *The Power supposed in the Few, over his owne Freedome.* / *The No-power over a mans own life.*

TOGETHER WITH

A BRIEFE *REPLY* TO Mr IOHN GOODWINS Υβεισοδίκαι, as far as concernes Dr. *HAMMOND.*

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VINDICATION

OF

MR. HANCOCK'S ADDRESS, &c.

A VINDICATION OF Dr. HAMMONDS *Addresse, &c.*

§. 1. THe late Author of the *Originall, and end of Civill Power*, under the name of *Eutactus Philodemius*, hath thought fit to question two things set downe by Doctor *Hammond* in his *Addresse to the Generall, and Counsell of War*. The first is this *Affirmation, That the Jew under Gods own Government might wholly give up himselfe, and his Freedome to his Masters Will (the power of life being onely exempted) and by having his eare bored, might of a free-man, become a slave for ever.* page 5.

§. 2. The second is this *Question, Whether ever any man was by God or Nature invested with power over his owne Life*, i.e. *to take away his owne life, or to kill himself?* page 18.

§. 3. This *Affirmation*, and this *Question*, he willingly acknowledges, and is content that the *Question* shall be interpreted a down-right *Negation, That never any man was by God, or Nature invested with power over his owne life, or power to kill himselfe.* And having thus confest the citation, as farre as concernes

him, it remaines, that I proceed to justifie, both parts of it. And to that end, I shall think my selfe sufficiently fortified by two advantages, which that *Authour* hath been pleased to allow me in this matter.

§. 4. First, that it is not any opinion of Doctor *Hamwond*, but the plaine words of *Scripture*, which are under his name, thus opposed by this Authour in both places. The former is *in terminis*, *Exodus* 21. at the beginning, *If the servant shall plainly say, I love my Master, &c. I will not goe out free, Then his Master shall bring him to the Judges, &c. And his Master shall bore his eare thorow with an awle, and he shall serve him for ever.* And againe, *Deut.* 15. 16. *And it shall be, if he* (i. e. *the servant set free at the Sabbatick year*) *say unto thee, I will not goe away from thee, &c. Then thou shalt take an awle, and thrust it thorow his ear unto the door, and he shall be thy servant for ever, and also to thy hand-maide thou shalt doe likewise.*

§. 5. That a plaine place of *Scripture* should be thus mistaken for an Assertion of Doctor *Hammond*, I am not permitted to suspect, because that *Author* hath to his mention of the Doctors Name added the testimony of *Gen.* 21. which, though it be a mistake, I suppose, of the Printer, for *Ex.* 21. will yet be a competent testimony of that *Authors* opinion, that Doctor *Hammond* had *Moses* on his side, and consequently, that both were to be involv'd by him in the same condemnation.

§. 6. The same, I suppose, I may assume of the other *Negation* questioned by him, that 'tis in Doctor *Hammond*, but the repeating of the 6. Commandement [*thou shalt not kill*] according to the latitude, wherein all Jewish, and *Christian* Writers have interpreted it to the prohibition of *self-murder*, as hath been shewed by him at large in another place.

Pract. Cat. l. 2. sect. 5.

§. 7. Having mentioned this first *advantage* against this *Author*, sufficient certainly to secure Doctor *Hammond* from his blame, and to make any *Apologie* for him unnecessary, and well-nigh scandalous (the *Word* of *God* being able to plead its owne cause, without the assistance of any humane *Advocate*) I have yet the benefit of a second kindnesse allowed me by this unknowne adversary; which, though *Scripture* were not of Authority with him, would encourage the Doctor not to fear the falling under his

his displeasure. That is, the unreconcileableness of those two opinions (the one with the other) which he is pleased to confront to Doctor *Hammond*, *viz.* that it should be *unlawfull* for a *Jew* to give up his *Freedome*, (and that *servitude* should be, as he calls it, an *unnaturall servitude*) and yet that it should be put in his power by *God* and *Nature* (for that is to affirme it *lawfull*, and agreeable to *Nature*) to take away his own *Life*, or to kill himselfe. For it being by *Job* mentioned as an *Aphorisme* of common Nature, that a man will *for his life give all he hath*; and in the accounts and practises of all men, that of *Liberty* being part of that *all*; It will consequently be unreasonable, and impossible for him that hath once affirmed the parting with ones freedome to be an *unnaturall servitude*, to deny the *killing of himself* to be an *unnaturall murther*; And therefore, having so faire advantages before me, not onely the *Scripture in terminis* on my side, but this *Adversary*, by so easie a consequence, become my *Second* also, I am (not unwillingly) perswaded to tender a brief reply to those reasons, which seeme to have drawn this Author into this casuall dispute, and to endeavour the preventing of those Errours; to which, a *Philodemius*, or *popular* disputer may in such an Age of *Licentiousnesse* betray others.

§. 8. To the case of the *Jewish Servant*, giving up his *freedome* to his *Master*, (which was by the Doctor mentioned out of *Moses*) the Authour hath framed three *Answers*.

§. 9. The first, *That it cannot be affirmed upon good and pregnant grounds, that from nature the Jew had any such power, but that God onely permitted it to be so; and the Jew, by this unnaturall servitude to his master, was a fit type of that slavery that man should be in unto Sin, to obey it in the lusts thereof; for his servants we are whom we obey.*

§. 10. To this I *Answer*, That the affirmation of *Moses* in the Scripture, [That this was *permitted by God* to the *Jewes*] is to me a *good and pregnant ground* that the *Jew* had this power under *Gods own Government*, which is all that he affirmes to be affirmed by Doctor *Hammond* in that place; and therefore, the putting in those other words [*Of the Jewes not having it from Nature*] seemes to be on purpose designed to take off from the *clearnesse*, and the *pregnancy* of the probation, and so onely

to darken, but not to invalidate the argument.

§. 11. But then ſecondly, I adde, that *Gods permitting* any thing to any man, is a *pregnant* argument, that from *Nature* that man *hath that power*: If by *Power* we mean a *morall power*, or *power* of doing it *without Sin*; And if by *Gods permiſſion* we underſtand his *Approbation*, as of a lawfull fact. For, thus it is certaine, that *God* never ſo *permits*, as to *approve* (or not prohibite) any thing, which by the *Law of Nature may* not be done *without ſinne*. For the *Law of Nature* being the *Law of God*, as truly as any *poſitive Law* of his promulgating; and *God* in all his *Lawes* being conſtant to himſelfe, ſo farre as never to *prohibit*, and *permit* the ſame thing at the ſame time to the ſame men; It is moſt certaine, that what *God* thus *permits*, *Nature permits* alſo, *i. e.* Leaves it *lawfull* to be done, or poſſible without *Sinne*.

§. 12. But if by *Permiſſion* this *Author* meanes no more then diſpenſation, or grant of preſent *Impunity*, ſuch as in the *Jewiſh* Common-wealth was (for the *hardneſſe of their hearts*) allowed in the buſineſſe of *divorce*, or (for the multiplying of them) in polygamy, then it will ſure reſt upon him to *prove*, and not only, as he ſaith, to *ſuppoſe*, that *God* thus (and thus only) permitted it to be ſo: But this I ſhall ſuppoſe impoſſible to be proved, though it cannot lie upon me to demonſtrate the *Negative*, nor ſhall I ſo much fear the probableneſſe of his unprov'd groundleſſe *ſuppoſition*, as to endeavour it. For indeed, what degree of *likeneſſe* is there betwixt thoſe *divorces* and *polygamies*, (which were ſuch inordinate *Liberties*) and this other of diveſting himſelfe of *Liberty*? Only the ſame that is betwixt two *Contraries*.

§. 13. I ſhall not need further to inſiſt on this, both for the plaine words of *Scripture*, and becauſe it is the acknowledgment of this very Author, page 18. *That this may lawfully be done for the obtaining of a greater good*, which being compared with *Rom.* 3. *ver.* 8. makes up a demonſtration, that a man hath this *power*, *i. e.* that he may *lawfully* doe it. For 'tis not the intuition of the greateſt *morall good*, much leſſe of the greateſt *advantage* to my ſelf, or any other, that may make that *lawfull* which in it ſelf is *unlawfull*, or which by *nature* man hath not *power* to doe.

And

§. 14. And therefore, when he addes, [*That in this the Jew was a fit type of mans ſlavery to ſinne*] as t'will be eaſily granted, that he was (as *type* ſignifies *Image* or *Embleme*) ſo ſure it will not prove that this *ſervitude* of the *Jew*, was an *unnaturall ſervitude*, any more then any other parts of the *Judaicall* Law, (which either in the intention of the *Law-giver*, or by the wit of Man can be made an Image of any preſent ſtate, or condition of men) can by that one Argument be proved to be *unnaturall*. For, ſure all *types* are not by that one evidence of their being *types* demonſtrated to be *ſinfull*, eſpecially when they are inſtituted, or permitted by *God*, and by that appeare to be agreeable to his *will*, in *Oppoſition* to, or *Variation* from which all *ſinne*, or *Obliquity* conſiſts: Or if this charge muſt fall ſingly on this *Type*, but not on all others (as ſure the *Paſſeover*, which was a *Type*, was not yet *unnaturall*, and ſo of the reſt) then muſt this charge be proved by ſome other *medium*, then by this onely, that it is a *Type*; and till that be produced, I muſt think this way of diſcourſe (which firſt ſuppoſes this giving up of the *Jewes Liberty* to be a *Type*, and then concludes it *unnaturall* for being ſuch) to be the proving of *quidlibet ex quolibet*, the ſame with his, which firſt ſuppoſes a live man to be a Picture, and then ſends him a challenge for being ſuch: Certainly ſuch reaſoning is too very looſe, and light, to ſet any good *Character* on that cauſe that wants ſuch ſupporters.

§. 15. His ſecond anſwer is yet a little more ſtrange, and ſuch as could not yet eaſily have been foreſeene, or expected, That his having his *ear bored was a puniſhment for his contempt of that Liberty, &c.* Tis ſufficiently known that this *boring of the ear* was the ceremony of receiving a *Servant* among the *Jewes*; and therefore, when *David* ſaith of Chriſt, *But mine eare haſt thou opened*, 'tis acknowledg'd, that thereby was denoted his *taking on him the forme of a ſervant*. This *boring of the ear with an awle* was no very painfull thing, ſure not ſo much as *Circumciſion*; and yet 'twould be a little ſtrange, that when a *Proſelite* was received among the *Jewes* with *Circumciſion*, that ſhould be deemed a puniſhment on him for his not continuing a *Gentile*, or that his Converſion to Judaiſme, of which this was the *Ceremony*, ſhould be thereupon counted an unnaturall Sinne: The *anſwering* ſuch

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Arguments as theſe, would require a more chearfull, and pleaſant humour, then the *times*, or *occaſion* of theſe debates will well permit.

§. 16. The laſt *Anſwer* lookes a little more *demurely*, *That his giving himſelfe up to be a ſlave for ever, did referre to, and terminate in the year of Jubilee, &c. and that he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave, &c.* [*That this was to terminate in the year of Jubilee*] is ſaid without farther proof, then onely of this unteſtified affirmation in a *Parentheſis*, *that that was the year of his freedome from that ſervitude which the corruption of his own will had brought upon him*, which is the *proving* a thing by a bare *repeating* of it in other words, and onely throwing a little *durt* upon it. For how doth it appear that it is a piece of *Corruption* (for a man that *loves his Maſter*, as the Text ſaith, and is better pleaſed with his ſervice, then with his former liberty) thus to chooſe that which he likes beſt? Or how comes the *caſting off Liberty to be a corruption of the will*, when *caſting off yokes*, and *ſervitude* is made capable of ſo good a *Character*? Had the words of Saint *Paul*, ſpeaking of ſervants, [*If thou canſt be free, uſe it rather*] been brought to back this *bare Aſſertion*, there had been ſome tolerable excuſe for ſuch a begging of the *queſtion* as this: But thoſe words extend not to a *command*, that every man ſhould be obliged to be *free*, that can, but onely to a *permiſſion*, that, if he will rather uſe it (*i. e.* preferre this *Liberty*) he moſt lawfully, and commendably may. But this Authour hath not thought fit to make this Interpretation, or account of that place neceſſary to be given him. As for the truth of his *Affirmation*, that this *Bondman with his ear bored, was releaſed at the year of Jubilee*, 'tis that, which, as it doth not well conſiſt with the words of *Moſes*, [*He ſhall ſerve him for ever*] *Exod.* 21. 6. and *Deut.* 15. 17. ſo it is not proved by any other place, or made probable that [*for ever*] is not an *abſolute* [*for ever.*] One place in *Leviticus*, there is *Chap.* 25. 41. which ſaith, that the *poor Brother* that is ſold to be a *bond ſervant*, *ſhall be free at the year of Jubilee*, and proportionably the *ſervant* (ſpoken of by me in *Exodus* and *Deuteronomy*) is to be ſet free from that *ſervitude*, to which he was *ſold* (*i. e.* the *forced* and *conſtrein'd*, not purely *voluntarily ſervitude*) in the *ſeventh*, or *ſabbatick* year, and ſo by the ſame reaſon

in

in the *Jubilee*, which is the great *Sabbatick* (made up of ſeven times ſeven) in the place of *Leviticus*.

§. 17. But this Author muſt mark, that this perſon thus ſet *free*, is not the *Jew* of whom Doctor *Hammond* ſpake, but the other that hath made the *voluntary ſurrender* of his *Liberty*, he that, when the *Sabbatick* yeare comes (or conſequently the year of *Jubilee*, which offers him the ſame releaſe) reſolves, that he will *not goe out free*, refuſes to make uſe of the advantage of a *Jubilee*, and ſo hath no more releaſes behind; and conſequently by this act of his is in an *irreverſible eſtate*, remains *a ſervant for ever*. And ſo this more ſpecious *anſwer* appeares to have as little of truth, or ſubſtance in it, as the two former.

§. 18. To which, yet I might further adde, That in caſe it were granted, that the next year of *Jubilee* gave this man releaſe alſo, yet would not this avoid the concludency of this place for the *lawfulneſſe of giving up our Liberty* (which is the onely point in hand) becauſe he that can doe it for *ſeven*, or for *fifty* yeares, can ſurely doe it: and although having done it, he ſhall have *Liberty*, after that number of yeares, to *retract*, if he pleaſe, yet is this no *obligation* that he *ſhall* retract, but onely a priviledge that he *may*, which priviledge he may againe as lawfully deny himſelfe to make uſe of, as before he did of his firſt *Liberty*.

§. 19. Mean while the *concluſion*, or cloſe of this *Authors* reaſoning is a little more *extraordinary* yet. For having from (the σθρον φαρμακὸν of) the *Jubilee*, inferr'd that *he did not make himſelf irrecoverably a ſlave*, he proceeds. [And if ſo (*i. e.* ſure, if he made not himſelfe a ſlave *irrecoverably*) *where is the warrant from God, or Nature, from paſſing away his freedome, or Liberty at all? and if ſo, how without recall, and irreverſibly?*] Is it poſſible this Author could think theſe concluſions demonſtrated ſo *logically*, as that he ſhould ſet them downe by way of *queſtion*, which ſuppoſes them irrefragable at the firſt asking?

§. 20. For the firſt of them, is not the *contrary* moſt demonſtrable? that if he were a *ſlave* till the year of *Jubilee*, (as tis confeſt he was, and withall that he was ſo by *Gods permiſſion*) then there is *warrant from God for paſſing away his Liberty in ſome* degree,

and for ſome ſpace, though not irrevocably. Doth not he ſerve at all, that ſerves not *eternally?* or is that no warrant at all, which is ſuch for a limited time only? Then ſure are we not at all *permitted* to be men, or *warranted* by *God*, or *Nature*, to live in this world, becauſe we have our *Jubilee* too, our time of *manumiſſion* from hence.

§. 21. And for the ſecond, what is that but a plaine *Circle*, firſt to infer the [*not at all*] from the [*not irrevocably*] and then in ſame breath, the [*not irrovocably*] from the [*not at all.*] How reconcileable this is with the Authours *popular* title of *Philodemius* I diſpute not, but reſolve, it is not the particular merit which beſtowed on him that other more *regular* of *Enactius*.

§. 22. And for the dexterity that is expreſt in the concluſion of the whole ſection, [*That therefore, that abſolute, and unreſerved reſignation of a mans native Liberty, &c. without any juſt condition, or adæquate exchange*, (which ſaith he, is hereby pleaded for by the Doctor) *can have no riſe, or origination from God, or reaſonable nature*] (impoſing on the *Doctor* directly againſt his ſenſe, thoſe words of ſo irrationall importance, [*without any juſt condition, or adæquate exchange*] I ſhall ſuppoſe that this was an effect of the neceſſary wants of his cauſe, and a diſcreet præviſion that his concluſion could not ſubſiſt without ſuch *ſupplies*, which made him venture on ſuch indirect meanes.

§. 23. For Doctor *Hammond* is not ſuch an enemy to man-kind, as to plead for ſuch *irrationall* actings, or to become his advocate that makes imprudent, or *unthrifty* bargaines, (though by the ſtrength of his *free will to evill*, he may poſſibly do ſo ſometimes, and be obliged by his owne act, and juſtly ſuffer the inconveniences, and ſmarts of it) but reſolveth, that both the *Campanians* in their *dedition*, and the *Barbarians* in their requeſt to the *Romans*, that they might have leave to become their *ſervants*; and the *Jew* in *Moſes's* ſuppoſition, that *loved his Maſter*, and preferr'd his *ſervice* before his *manumiſſion*, (I ſhall adde my ſelfe alſo, who profeſſe to prefer (in my choice for my ſelfe) *ſubjection* before abſolute *Liberty*, nay, before *Soveraignty* it ſelfe, and believe it a farre more *ſober*, and conſequently *rationall* ſpeech in *Saul*, 1 *Sam.* 9. 21. which expreſt ſome aver-

averſation to *Samuels* propoſal about *anointing* him, then that other of *Abſolons, O that I were a Judge, or King, &c.*) did all part with their *Liberty* upon *adequate exchanges*, ſuch, as they (which were the fitteſt judges what themſelves thought) did conceive to be the full *worth* of the commodity they parted with: And ſuch a *rationall* power of parting with abſolute *Liberty* for ſomewhat that I like better, (*i. e.* for *ſubjection* to *Government*, which is, 1. in it ſelfe, farre removed from *ſlavery*; and 2. is the onely way to *ſecure* men from the *danger* of it) is all that that *Addreſſe* had occaſion to aſſert, or plead for at thattime.

§.24. One thing more there is, which I may be allowed to adde, (having thus farre reply'd to all his anſwers) that the concluſion which was in the *Addreſſe* inferr'd from that practice of the *Jewes*, was farther confirm'd by the practice of diverſe *Heathens*, who can neither be excuſed by the pretence of a *permiſſion*, or ſpeciall *diſpenſation* from *God* to doe unnaturall things (as he thinks may be affirmed of the *Jew*) nor yet were obſerved by the moſt rational *Hiſtorians* to have done any thing contrary to *Reaſon* or *Nature*, in changing abſolute Liberty for ſomewhat which ſeemed better, and more advantagious to them, to wit, for ſecurity, and *proteſtion, i.e.* in changing a ſtate of common *hoſtility*, (the unhappieſt lot in nature) for that other (ſet down by the *Apoſtle* as the object of their Chriſtian * *purſuite*, and *emulation*, and * *contention*) a quiet ſetled *peace*. The advantage of which change, he that is not inclined to acknowledge, muſt be of a temper of *minde*, or body ſo diſtant from that, which *God* hath given me, that I ſhall not wonder, that that which ſeemes to me moſt demonſtratively aſſerted, is to him ſo farre from being acknowledged ſuch. I ſhall adde no more to the vindicating of the firſt propoſition, till I meet with the *temptation* of better, or more dangerous *arguments* againſt it.

* διώκετε εἰρήνην.

* φιλοτι μεῖσθε ἡσυχάζειν.

§. 25. I proceed as briefly to the ſecond, which is propoſed in the *Addreſſe* by way of *queſtion, Whether ever any man was by God, or Nature, inveſted with power of his owne Life*, i. e. *with power to take away his owne Life, to kill himſelfe?* The vindicating of which, I muſt acknowledge a taske, to which I did not expect, that the Doctor ſhould be call'd; having not, till now, been ſo fully convinced of the danger, and

ill conſequences of favouring the exceſſes of thoſe mens wits, who have maintained *paradoxes*, or of the improvidence of thoſe that have tempted others by the publiſhing of them.

§. 26. For certainly about two yeares ſince, before the time, that the *poſthumous* Βιαθάν: was ſet out, a man might in this Nation have adventur'd to have asked ſo calme a *queſtion* [*whether a man might Lawfully kill himſelf?*] and not have feared a challenge in *Print* for this injury, or encroachment upon the liberty of our *Nature*. And I conceive thoſe Lawes of our Land, which have look'd on this *ſelfe-ſlaughter*, as an inhumane crime, and puniſh'd it after *Death*, with the deniall of *Chriſtian buriall*, & a marke of reproach upon the *grave*, might, when time was, have been able to have come in to the aſſiſtance of ſo known a *truth*; had not the ſacred rites of *Chriſtian buryall* been now ſo deſpiſed, and profaned, that the wanting them hath ceaſed to be eſteemed a puniſhment among us; had not the Cuſtome of *killing* other men ſo haraſs'd our Conſciences, and obliterated all the remainders of written, and unwritten *Lawes*, that we need not be wondred at, if the *ſwords*, which have been ſo fleſht abroad, miſtake their way ſometimes, and return on the owners breſts. And laſtly, had not the deduction been ſo prone, and eaſie from the *Generall*, to the *particulars*, from the *Lawfulneſſe* of a *Nations* deſtroying *it ſelfe*, to a *ſingle perſons* going, and doing likewiſe, from the juſtifying of *civil* inteſtine ſlaughters of the *publicke*, to that other more tolerable crime of a *ſingle violence*.

§. 26. As it is, I ſhall not endeavour to perſwade my ſelfe (as the *Pyrrhonian* in *Sextus Empiricus*, would teach me to do) that I was in a dream, when I read D. *Hammond* cited, and confuted for thus affirming; I muſt rather provide for the encounter, and haſten to *anſwer* the *arguments*, which this Author hath offered againſt this branch of the ſixt *commandement* (as he met with it in the Doctors hands) or elſe twill be poſſible this opinion may gather *Proſelytes* alſo in this age, wherein nothing can be ſaid ſo incredible, which ſome men doe not make a ſhift to take up, and believe very contentedly.

§. 27. His firſt argument is drawne from the Doctors Conceſſion, that *man hath power from God and Nature over his owne body*

body to cut, and lance it, and over his owne freedome to passe it away, from whence, if he doe any thing, he must undertake to conclude, that *therefore he hath power over his life* also; And to doe that, he must make good these three things:

§. 28. 1. That since the confutation of the former proposition, he hath now chang'd his minde, and agrees with Doctor *Hammond*, that a man hath from *God* or *Nature power* over *his freedome to passe it away*, (for otherwise, though it will be an advantage against Doctor *Hammond*, who *confest* it, yet will it not be of use to himself who professeth the contrary) and again that he hath forgotten, what in his very last period he had affirmed [*that God doth not intrust and allow any man to have power to destroy his owne image*, i. e. *to take away mans life, but him, or them whom he makes Gods*, i.e. *Magistrates to whom he deputes his owne place*] for sure it cannot be thought, that every *private man* in the *community* of *Nature*, is such a *Vicegerent of God*, or *Magistrate*.

§. 29. 2. That the *argument, à minori ad majus affirmativè*, is valid, against all *Logicke*, viz: That he that hath power over the *body*, or over *freedome*, is supposed to have *power over Life also*, and so that the *Surgeon*, that may scarify the flesh, or *cut* off an Arme, may therefore as Lawfully *slash* the throate, and *cut off* the *head* also, and in like manner that the Master by being such, is become the *Judge* of his Servant, and hath among *Christians* that *power* of his *Life*, which he hath seldome been allowed among the worst of Heathens.

§. 30. And 3. That *God*, which hath put something in our power, is thereby obliged to reserve nothing to himselfe; Or that by giving us the *usus fructus*, or benefits of Life, he hath giving us the absolute *dominion*, and propriety of it also.

§. 31. But without either of these 3 more difficult undertakings, the *Authour* hath attempted an easier way, by supposing that neither *cutting of flesh*, nor *Parting with freedome may be endured by God or Nature, unlesse they referre to such an end, whereby a farre greater good is to be enjoyed, and obtained: that cutting or lancing (without this necessary circumstance of a greater good) is a step or degree toward selfe murther*, &c. From whence the *Conclusion*, I suppose, must be, that by the same reason the *Killing* of ones *selfe*, may then also be conceiv'd allowable by *God*, when

it is referr'd by me to ſuch an *end*, whereby a far *greater good is to be enjoyed*, and *obtained*, but never elſe.

§. 32. To which I ſhall make theſe clear Replyes, 1. That a thing directly *forbidden* by God, cannot be thought approveable by him, upon the referring of it to a *morall* (much leſſe if it be but an *advantagious* or *profitable*) *good* end. *Their damnation is juſt, that ſay, they may doe evill that good may come:* And that this is not a *begging* of the *queſtion*; but that, indeed, *ſelf-homicide is* evill, and forbidden by *God*, will be clear by remembring theſe three things, 1. That the command of not *killing*, is *indefinite*; and that he that *kils himſelfe*, doth certainly *kill*, that he that *ſheds his own bloud*, *ſheds* the *bloud* of a *Man*: and 2. That the *Image of God* reſiding on him (which is the *ground* of this prohibition in *Moſes, Gen.9. 6.*) is as truly ſo, when 'tis beheld in the *reflexion*, as when in the *direct line*, in my ſelf, as in any other man. 3. That the power of *Life* is *Reſerved* a peculiar to *God*, and not communicated to the Creature, (ſave onely to his *Vice-gerent*) which may thus appear. *God* as the *Creator* of the World, and ſole doner of *life* muſt be acknowledged to have the *dominion* over it: This *dominion* conſequently is *communicated* to none but to thoſe to whom by *God* it is *communicated*; To the *Magiſtrate* this *power* is given by that Law of *God*, whereby he preſcribes the putting certain Malefactors to *Death*; and whereby he conſtitutues the *Magiſtrate* his *Vice-gerent* on Earth, and ſo the *executioner* of that *Law, an avenger for wrath, Rom.13.* And whoſoever will challenge the like *power*, muſt ſhew the like *charter*, and evidence; and if he cannot doe that, that is ſufficient to prove that he *hath* it not; As 'tis ſufficient to *convict* any man of the injuſtice of any *his* claime to *my* eſtate, that he cannot ſhew any *deed* whereby it was convey'd to *him* from *me*; And there need no other *Affirmative* proof againſt ſuch an one, then that it was *once* in *me*, and it appeares not how it parted from me to any other. And therefore, till ſome *evidence* be produced, (which I ſuppoſe will never be) that *this power* of *life* is made over from *God* to every *private* man, the demonſtration is abundantly clear, that that *power* is not in any *private* man any more over *himſelfe* then *others*. And it is obſervable to *this* very purpoſe, that though the *Stoicks*, to teach their Diſciples *apathy*, or courage againſt

againſt whatſoever events did talk of that ſure remedy againſt all temporal preſſures, the *going out*, or *killing themſelves*, (looking on it favourably as a *refuge*, or *ſanctuary* from all thoſe things which might otherwiſe be phanſied unſupportable) yet when they conſidered it this other way, (as every thing, they ſaid, had *two handles*) *i. e.* in reſpect of *God*, who placed them here; it was generally reſolved by them, *viz.* by *Seneca*, and the wiſeſt of them (and the more fooliſh of that Sect, are ſeldome found to *practice* the contrary) that we muſt not on our own heads *deſert* our *ſtation*, but maintaine that ground on which our *Generall* hath ſet us, and waite with courage and patience, till he think fit to command us off againe. As for the other two, power over the *fleſh*, and the *freedome*, the *cutting* of one, and *parting* with the other, they are no degrees toward the taking away *life*, but on the contrary are uſed on purpoſe for the preſerving of it, in its being, or well being, the one by the rules of phyſick, the other of policy; and therefore is the power of thoſe allowed us by God, and Nature, becauſe they are thus inſtrumentall to that end, and ſubmitted to our diſcretion, becauſe they may be ſo. Thus are ſome things referred to the *Stewards* judgement, and put into his *power*, to *diſpoſe* for the good of the Family, and yet others *reſerv'd* peculiar, and *ſacred* in the *Maſters* own hands. Thus are my *Writings* put into my *Lawyers* hand, for him to uſe to the preſerving of my *Eſtate*; yet is not my *Eſtate* put into his *power* to diſpoſe of it at his pleaſure for ſome greater end. And the argument would be very infirme, becauſe that *power* which the *Steward*, or Lawyer hath intruſted to him, ought not to be uſed by him, but in order to ſome *good end*; that therefore, that which is not ſo *entruſted* to him, may be thus aſſumed alſo. Some *rayes* there have alwayes been communicated from Heaven to this Earth of ours; and yet ſome *Flowers* of of that celeſtiall *Crown*, which have been *reſerved* as *ſacred*, and *incommunicable*. And ſo there will be no kind of weight or concludency in this preſent way of *arguing*, this *ballancing* of *fleſh* or *liberty* with *Life*, till it appear alſo from the *ſame*, or equall *evidence*, that thoſe are *reſerved* by *God*, as Life appears to be. This certainly without any more help, is a full ſatisfaction to this argument.

But

§. 33. But then ſecondly, *& ex abundanti*, the *Killing my ſelf* is no way ordinable to *good*, 1. 'Tis not ordinable to mine owne *preſent worldly advantage*, as *lancing*, and *ſubjection* may be, that is clear; and that is a reaſon why *God* ſhould not give us this *Liberty*, (though if we were not able to render *reaſons*, the *Wiſdome* of the Law-giver were *reaſon* enough) and for *future* advantages to *my ſelfe*, the *being with Chriſt*, which is *farre better*, 1. that cannot be taken notice of by bare *Nature*, till that be *Chriſtianized:* and then 2. according to the *Chriſtians* rules, we have all reaſon to reſolve that 'twill not be purchaſt by any other way, but by that which *God* hath preſcribed toward it, *i. e.* by lawfull unprohibited courſes. It being evident, that the *Crown* which is held in *Gods* hand ſhall not be diſpenced to any, but thoſe, which doe νομίμως ἀθλεῖν, *ſtrive lawfully*, and that *patience* of waiting till *God* calls, is one of the Lawes that are thus preſcribed in our ἀγῶνες.

§. 34. As for advantages to *others*, the *Publick-weal*, or *peace*, 'tis not imaginable, how the *killing my ſelf* can be directly, or otherwiſe then by accident, ordinable to that; whatſoever can be conceived of it, will be as ſufficiently *provided* for by the *Magiſtrates* having *power of life*; and that he may have from *God* immediately, as well as he can be ſuppoſed to have it from any act of collation from *me*, if 'twere in my *power*.

§. 35. Laſtly, For any *morall*, or *Chriſtian* virtue, or yet farther, the *illuſtrating* of the Glory of our *Creatour*, (which alone deſerve the title of *good ends*) 'tis not the having an *unlimited power*, that *immediately*, or *directly* contributes to theſe, but the making *uſe* of the *limited powers* we have, the *imploying* the *lives* which he hath given us, according to his *Will*, and not the *deſtroying* them *contrary* to it, I ſhall not need to proſecute this. All that is in this place pretended by the Author to this purpoſe, is onely this, that a *man may freely conſent, and willingly expoſe his life to death for a greater, or publiker good.*

§. 36. Where by *conſenting* I ſhall ſuppoſe him to mean a *conſent* of the *will* to that action which immediately followes, *i. e.* to the *expoſing his life to death*, (and if by *conſent* he ſhould mean any thing elſe, as the *conſenting*, that the other ſhall *kill* him, or the making it *free* and *lawfull* to that other, to take away his *Life*, then

then hath he put two very distant things together, and so 'tis but the ordinary fallacy *plurium interrogationum*, and in that Notion of *Consenting* I shall anon shew that man *may not*, i. e. hath not *power* so to *Consent*.) And to the proving of this, it is, that his remaining endeavours (as farr as concernes Doctor *Hommond*) are directed. And accordingly he saith, *He will be so bold as to state the Question as it ought*, i. e. to remove it from the words and sence wherein Doctor *Hammond* proposed it (and in which it is that his whole discourse is grounded) to those other words of his owne, most extreamly distant in *sound* and *sence*; and in which I am as confident, that the truth is on his side, (if *Consent* signifie no more then I take it to signifie) as I am, that that truth doth not contradict those other truths, which by Doctor *Hammond* are superstructed on his foundation; or that the *Proposition*, as 'tis stated by the Doctor, is all that is necessary to be affirm'd for the founding of the rest of his discourse.

§. 37. For I desire to know, whether there be no difference betwixt *killing my self*, and *exposing my life to death?* If so, then it must be not onely *lawfull* so to *kill my self* (which is all the Author demands) but sometimes an act of *duty*, and *necessity* also: For so certainly (in the assisting my *Soveraign*, or Country to *hazard*, and *expose* my life, when I am thereto lawfully called; and so againe, to *suffer Martyrdome* in the confession of *Christ*, or discharge of any *Christian* duty, is not onely *lawfull* for me to doe, but I *sinne* if I doe it not. And yet I doe not perceive that this *Authour* hath laid this obligation, or necessity on himselfe, or any man else in any case to *kill* (or lay *violent hands* upon) himselfe, and so I suppose he is still of the Doctors mind, (though he be willing to conceal it) that there is a *difference* between these.

§. 38. And if there yet want any farther light to the clearing of this difference between this [*having power of my owne life* so as to *kill my selfe*, and that [*having power of* my *life*, so as to *expose* it, or venture it in a *good Cause*] I shall (for the concluding of this Paper) propose the plaine difference betweene them.

§. 39. And that may be taken from the nature of the word [*exposing*] for that we know signifies no more, then to submit

it to an *hazard*, and ſo to *expoſe* my *life*, is to *hazard* my life: In doing ſo, all that can be affirm'd of me, is no more then this, that I am *willing*, or *content* (and by my actions expreſſe that willingneſſe) to loſe my life, if *God* pleaſe to permit it to be taken from me.

§. 40. When my *life* is thus loſt, three things muſt neceſſarily concurre to it, 1. The *Violence* of the invader; 2. The *Providence of God* permitting him to invade; and 3. My *not reſiſting*, or my not uſing the meanes (which were naturally poſſible for me to uſe) to prevent, or avoid the violence of this *invaſion*, as when *Chriſt* might have uſed *Angels* (and another *flight*, and a third *complyance*, and *caution*) but chooſeth not to doe ſo. Of theſe three the onely *efficient cauſe* of the action (of *killing*) is the malicious violent *invader*; ſure neither the *providence* of *God* in *permitting*, nor my owne *meekneſſe*, or *obedience* to *Chriſt* in *following* him, though it be to the very *Croſſe*.

§. 41. In this caſe, ſuppoſing that it be for a *good End* that I now *expoſe* my life; it is alſo ſuppoſed, that the purſuance of that end is either *duty* in me, a thing that I am abſolutely bound to, as the *Confeſſion* of *Chriſt*, &c. or elſe that tis *exceſſe* of *Charity*, to which, though it be not under *particular* precept, yet the Intuition of ſome great, and *glorious* end doth ſo *invite*, and incline me, that tis *heroicall Virtue* in me to doe it, and that which (though *God* doth not ſo require it of me, as that I *ſinne*, if I doe it not, yet) he hath promiſed to *reward abundantly*, whenſoever 'tis done *for his ſake*.

§. 42. In the former of theſe caſes, when the purſuance of that *good end* is *ſtrict duty*, as in caſe I am commanded to *confeſſe Chriſt*, or to aſſiſt my *Prince* in protecting my Country, There as my endeavour is required of me by that *precept*, ſo is my *utmoſt* endeavour, ſuch as I muſt not remit, whatſoever the *danger* be; And if that *danger* prove to be the *utmoſt danger*, even of my *life* it ſelfe, yet the *command* of *Conſtancy*, of not *fearing*, or *fainting*, and the character of *perfect love* given by Saint *John*, that it *caſts out fear*, and the denunciations againſt the *fearfull*, or *cowardly*, doe all joyne to extend my obligation, to purſue this ſo neceſſary *End* without any receding, and if the *Croſſe* it ſelf lie in my way toward this end, to *take it up*, i. e. willingly to

ſubmit

ſubmit to *Gods* Providence, which hath thought fit to call me to this *Tryall*, if it be even of *reſiſting unto bloud*. And ſo ſtill all that I doe, is the *conſtant, patient, chearfull ſubmiſſion* to *Gods* Will (in his *providentiall diſpoſing* of my life, and in *permitting* the injurious to take it from me) and nothing elſe; an abſolute choiſe of *Obedience*, but not of *Death*; a ſacrificing to duty all *deſire* of *life*, but not otherwiſe undertaking to diſpoſe of it.

§. 43. Hence is it that my *venturing* of my *Life* doth not clear, or free the *Invader*, from any degree of ſinne, or guilt in thus taking it away from me. 'Twas but a *Sarcaſme* or *Trope* in *Julians* Souldiers, to ſay, they did not wrong the *Chriſtians* by *killing* them, but onely haſten them to their deſired home: And the *Fathers* were able to anſwer the *Paralogiſme* by the rule in *Ethickes*, diſtinguiſhing betwixt a *mixt*, and *abſolute will*; and ſo concluding their *ſlaughters* to be *Injuries*, though they were willingly embraced, the *Perſecutors* to be *Perſecutors* ſtill, though the other were *Martyrs*.

§. 44. Which is a *demonſtrative* proof, that 'tis the *Invader*, not *Sufferer*, whoſe *act* the killing is ſuppoſed to be, and ſo that I am not in this caſe of *expoſing my Life*, ſuppoſed to give any *Conſent* that he ſhall *kill* me, or conſequently to diveſt my ſelf of the *power* of my *life*, or indeed to have any ſuch *power* over it. For whatſoever is abſolutely in my *power* to *diſpoſe* of, that I may lawfully conſent to part with; That if I doe part with it, *ipſo facto*, and *jure* * becomes his, to whom I part with it (and if there be any errour in it, 'tis chargeable on the *giver*, who was thus profuſely *Liberall* above the proportion:) And conſequently for him to take and uſe it, is in *him* no ſinne; As that part of my Eſtate which is in my power, may by me be paſt over to another by *gift*, and being ſo, is lawfully *poſſeſt*, and enjoy'd by the *receiver*.

* *Data to ipſo quo dantur, fiunt accipientis.* Iuriſt.

§. 45. And therefore, I ſay, if the lawfullneſſe of the *expoſing* my Life would conclude me to have a *power* over it, it muſt be as perfectly lawfull for the *Tyrant*, into whoſe hands my *Life* (in the *confeſſing* of *Chriſt*) is by me expoſed, to take that *Life* from me, as 'tis for the poor man into whoſe hands my *goods* are by me put (in obedience to *Chriſts* command of *mercifulneſs*) to *receive*,

and *carry* away thoſe *goods*; which being an abſurdity too groſſe to be defended by any, will, I ſuppoſe, incline this Author to diſcerne the diſtance betwixt the queſtions, as the *one* is by him, and as the *other* was by Doctor *Hammond* propoſed.

§. 46. And in like manner alſo, when the End purſued by me, is (though not abſolutely *neceſſary*, yet) *better* and *more excellent*; there the Precept of being *faithfull* unto *death*, and the *promiſe* of *reward* made to him tht layes down, or *loſes his life for Chriſts ſake*, doe as much oblige to *conſtancy*, at leaſt, as much aſſure that ſuch *conſtancy* ſhall be acceptable to *God*, (and that the more by how much greater the *hazard*, and *terrours*, and *temptations* are to the contrary) as when the particular matter of the action was under *precept*. And ſo that other *accidentall* difference will make no variation in the main, nor make it at all probable, that *expoſing* my life *heroically* was not warranted by *God*, when *expoſing* it *neceſſarily*, was ſuppoſed to be ſo: it being as certain that *God* doth *warrant* me to doe that which he *commends*, as what he ſtrictly *commands* to me: And therefore what was ſaid in the caſe of *duty*, doth as truly hold (and ſo needes not to be repeated againe) in this caſe of [*more excellent*] alſo.

§. 47. Having thus far proceeded, it will now be unneceſſary for me to anſwer the *Arguments* which this *Author* addes in this matter, becauſe the *Queſtion* being by him changed from that, which was propoſed by Doctor *Hammond* (and ſtated *Negatively*) to another, which no man can be more ready to *affirme*, and aſſert then that Doctor; It would be an impertinent niceneſſe in him to refuſe to have his Opinion confirmed by another mans reaſons; I ſhall rather wiſh that all his proofs were demonſtrative, and *effectuall* to conclude, what Doctor *Hammond affirms* with him; and onely briefly ſhew, that they are *ineffectuall* to prove what that Doctor *denies*, and that will ſoon be done by the moſt curſory mention of them.

§. 48. For firſt, I grant with him that *God permitted his owne Sonne to be put to death by the hands of violent, and unjuſt men*, but ſee no *conſequence* from thence, that *Chriſt*, as a Man might lawfully have *taken away* his own *Life*; as for the phraſe of *laying down the life for the ſheep*, that ſure ſignifies not the *killing himſelf*,

(for

for the *goodneſſe* of the *Shepheard* conſiſts not in that) the cutting his owne throat, when the *Wolfe* invades the Flock; but the making uſe of his *Life* to the utmoſt, wherein it may be *advantageous* to the *Sheep*, and *venturing*, and hazarding it in their defence, or quarrell; yea, and contentedly ſuffering (not acting in) his own *death*, that he may be able to avert theirs. For this is the meaning of τιθέναι ψυχὴν, to *lay downe* the life, (ῥιψοκίνδυνον εἶναι, *to venture himſelfe voluntarily into danger*, παραβολεύεσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ, in the notion in which the *Greek Gloſſaries* explain the phraſe, from παράβολον, *i. e.* ἐπικινδυνεύων in *Heſychius*, and the *Latine*, *Parabolanum anima ſua eſſe*, *i. e.* all one with ἐκβάλλειν) to *expoſe* it, not to be ſo *ſolicitous* for the *defence* of it, as to forgoe *duty*, or *charity*, or care of the poor *ſheep* intruſted to him, for the preſerving of it.

§. 49. A ſecond Argument is by this *Author* touched on (though not formally urged by him) that the *preſerving whole ſocieties from periſhing is a good, and a publick end, and that the impunity of offenders being the readieſt way to the diſſolution, and deſtruction of ſocieties, Nature is ſuppoſed to dictate that one man ſhould rather juſtly die, than whole ſocieties unjuſtly periſh.* This Concluſion, and Premiſſes, the Doctor doth, as the Author foreſaw, moſt willingly acknowledge, but withall diſcernes not, how it proves that a man hath *power over his owne life*: It will be ſufficient if *God* by any other meanes (as by inſtating it in the *Prince* &c.) do place that *power of life* in others. The utmoſt which this way of arguing can pretend to conclude, is, 1. That whatſoever anyman hath in his *own power*, that tis reaſonable for him to deliver up into the *Governours hand*, (thus to make it eaſie, or poſſible to diſcharge his *truſt*, and by theſe advantages to contribute to the publike quiet and weale.) Nay 2. that *God* that hath the *power of life*, and ſees how *uſefull* 'tis to have that veſted in *Governours*, ſhould conſequently be ſuppoſed ſo to veſt it (And that he doth ſo, is the clear acknowledgment of the *Addreſſe*.)

§. 50. But ſure it cannot extend ſo farre, as to make a man *give* (or *have*) that which he *hath* not, nor to reſtraine *God* from having the ſole *Originall* power of that, which otherwiſe might be acknowledged to be veſted in him.

§. 51. As for the *ſuppoſition*, which the *Author* here addes on the

back of this, [*In case* 10 *men in the community of Nature chose one to rule over them, and one of them thus spontaneously subjected shall murther one of his fellow Subjects*] (*whereupon he demands whether the ruler so set up may not by his own consent by virtue of that power he received from him among the rest, put such a Murtherer to death*) To this I answer, that the *Governour* may in this case *put the Murtherer to death*, but this not by *virtue* of any *power*, or *consent* of the Murtherer, but by *authority* from *God*, who alone hath the *power of life*; In relation to which it is that the *Governour* is styled διάκονος θεοῦ, *a Minister of God*, in this very notion, as he is ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν, *an avenger for wrath* or *punisher* of offenders.

§. 52. That which is in the *Subjects power* the *Governour* may have by the Subjects *consent*, and by *virtue* of the *power which he received from him*; And therefore it is that the *power* of *violent resisting* invaders, the right of *repelling force by force*, which *God* and *Nature* hath given the *single* man in *community* of *Nature*, is now, in case of submission to the *Governour*, parted with, and deposited by him, so far as refers to the *Governor*, and though it be founded in *selfe-defence*, yet he that thus violently resists *the powers*, shall *receive to himselfe damnation*.

§. 53. But still that which is not in the *Subjects power*, is not, nay cannot be vested by the *subject* in the *Governour*, but flowes from an higher principle (from him that really hath the *power*) and comes from the *Subjects consent*, onely, as from the *causa sine quâ non*, or by way of *resultance*; That as *God* communicates not this *power* of life to any but the *Governour*; so that mans *Consent*, that hee should be his *Governour*, doth remotely (and by way of *condition*, or *qualifying* of the subject to a capacity of receiving that *power* from *God*) concurre to the vesting of that *power* in that person. Thus doth the *temper* of the aire contribute to the qualifying the *slime*, or putrid matter to receive *influences* from the *Sunne*, and then those *influences* beget *life* in it, and endow it with that higher principle, which the *temper* of the *aire*, that contributed all it could, (having not thus much in its *power*) could not be affirm'd to *contribute* to it.

§. 54. And so you see the Doctors way of stating this question doth as fully provide for the *punishing of Malefactors*, and

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preſerving of communities, as the ſuppoſing the power *of life to proceed* originally from the *People*, would be able to doe; As he that affirmes the *Soule* in every birth to be *infuſed* by *God*, makes as ſure a proviſion for *Generation*, and conſequently for the *preſervation* of the humane *ſpecies*, as they that ſuppoſe the *Soul* to be *traduced* from the *Parents*, as well as the *Body*.

§. 55. His laſt Argument is from *Rom.* 5. 7. *For a good man one would dare to die*, i. e. ſaith he, would *With the preſence of a reſolved Spirit die*; the word [*daring*] ſaith he, noting a *preſence of minde terrified With no dangers*. To this Argument againe, as far as by the Author it can be extended, *i. e.* to the acknowledgement, or concluding of the *lawfullneſſe of a valiant couragious ſuffering of death*, either for a *publick good*, or for ſome act of eminent *private charity*, I am fully of the *Authors* mind.

§. 56. But the word [*dying*] in that place, ſignifying no more then *ſubmiſſion of the Will*, contentedneſſe, or willingneſſe to ſuffer *death*, not by his *owne*, but by ſome other mans *hands*, an ἀντιψυχία, a taking thoſe blowes (though never ſo ſharp and mortall) on his *owne ſhoulders*, and breſt, which were meant by the Enemy to another (to the *mercifull*, or *good* man in that Text) there is no *Logick* can conclude from hence, that a man hath any *power* over his owne *life*, to *take* it away from *himſelfe* by any act of *force*, (as αὐθέντης among the Attick Writers, is, ſaith *Phrynicus*, uſed ὅτι τῷ αὐλόχειρι & φονεῖ, *He that kils himſelfe, takes upon him an Independent Authority over himſelfe*) or to give it into another mans hands, ſo that he may without any farther *Authority* (without any inveſtiture of the *power* of the *Sword* from *God*) *lawfully* take it from him. I ſhall conclude this with an obſervation of *Boethius*, that the *love* of *life* is not ſeated in the *Will of the Creature*, but in the *principles of Nature*. That ſo our lives may not be ventured on the uncertainties & hazards of our owne paſſions, or ſatieties, which may incline the will to prefer death ſometimes, but in the *inſtincts* of that more conſtant immutable Rule, which alwayes preſcribes the preſerving of thoſe treaſures, by God and Nature entruſted to us.

Nam nec in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animæ voluntatibus verum ex naturæ principiis venit, Namque mortem cogentibus cauſis, quam natura reformidat, voluntas amplectitur, &c. de conſol. Phil. l. 3. Proſ. 11.

§. 57. Having made this ſhort, and ſuddaine returne to this Authors reaſonings, Doctor *Hammond* will leave the matter moſt willingly, where this Author hath placed it, at the feet of all

all *ingenuous, and unprejudiced Readers*, and will endeavour (as unpassionately as any man) to approve himself a *Servant of Reason*, and embracer, or *friend of Truth, wheresoever he meets with it*; upon which score, he is content to acknowledge some Obligations to this *Author*, who hath occasioned this farther survey of his former affirmations, and given all other men some cause to be more *confirmed* in the perswasion and assurance of the truth of them. And thus much I conceive is sufficient to have said upon this occasion.

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§. 58. BUt it seemes the *Readers quiet* is not to be obtain'd so easily; for while that which hath been thus said was under the *Printers* hand, Mr. *John Goodwin's* ὑβριστοδίκαι came forth, and by the mention of Doctor *Hammonds* name twice in his Title page, gave reason to delay this *Vindication* so long, till it might appear whether 'twould be usefull to adde any thing to it (upon this new occasion) by way of *Post-script*. And herein it hath proved a little unluckily, that this *second Advocate* of the same cause falling upon this passage in the *Addresse* (the Subject of our present discourse) hath yet in his judgement upon it so varied from the former Author, that as he hath yeilded the questi-
pag. 22. on hitherto debated, and confest that *no man hath by nature the power over his owne life*; so he hath provided a new task for me, by denying the Doctors *consequence* from hence, [*that then this power cannot be derived to Kings by Men, or from the People.*] This I confesse is somewhat strange that that should be imagined *derivable by men, or from the people*, which at the same time 'tis confest *no man hath*. I have lately learn'd a * *Scotch Proverb* from Master *Henderson*, and finde by search the meaning of it to be this plaine *English*, that nothing is derivable from any place, which was never there: and Mr. *Goodwin* acknowledges *the strength of that consequence to stand in the authority of this Maxime*, Nihil dat quod non habet, *Nothing gives that to another which it hath not it selfe*. And truly, I shall never desire a firmer *basis* for any conclusion of mine then such an acknowledged *Principle* as this. Should

* That cannot be brought But, that is not the Ben.

I

I finde any part of my poſſeſſions in M. *Goodwins* hands, and he juſtifie his Title to it, by pretending the *donation*, or *ſale* from *Philodemius* to him, and I produce evidence that this was never in the poſſeſſion of *Philodemius*, would there be any more required of me, to couclude conſequently, that 'twas not *derivable* from *Philodemius* to him? would it not be a ſtrange reply, to ſay, That *this conſequence depended on the Authority of a Topick Maxime?* The word [*Topicke*] I ſuppoſe to be here prefixt by him upon a deſigne of *diminution*, as *Topicall* is equivalent with *probable*, and oppos'd to *demonſtrative*. But I hope this is not thus a *Topick Maxime*. Can any *demonſtration* be more convincing, then that which is built upon a *Principle*, as acknowledg'd as any in the *Mathematicks*, and the contrary of which implies a *contradiction* [*to have*, and *not to have?*]

§. 59. As for the reaſon of denying this conſequence, which Maſter *Goodwin* renders, becauſe [*though no particular man hath by nature this power over his owne Life, yet as a member of community he hath, not ſimply a power, but a neceſſity lying upon him by way of duty, &c. to conſent with others, that his life ſhall be taken from him*] 1. 'Tis not to me imaginable, that he ſhould have a *neceſſity of duty* lying upon him, who hath not *ſimply a power*, meaning, as here he muſt, a *power* of doing it *lawfully*. And 2. For this *power*, or *neceſſity of conſenting* onely (as that differs frō *the power of giving*) this will be of no kind of force, unleſſe it alſo appear that the *Magiſtrate* derives the *power of life* (which is ſuppos'd to be in him) from this *conſent* of theirs, or that it is this conſent of theirs, and nothing elſe which gives him that *power*. But this is ſo far from being *proved*, that it is not ſo much as *affirm'd* by Maſter *Goodwin*: And on the other ſide 'tis clear, that the bare *conſenting* that a thing ſhall be taken out of my hands, is very diſtant from the taking upon me to *give it*; the latter pretends and ſuppoſeth a *poſſeſſion*, or *inveſtiture* in the *giver*, the former doth not in the *Conſenter*; and ſo, though the latter would be of ſome uſe (if granted) to inferre Mr. *Goodwins* concluſion, that the *power is originally from the people*, yet the former will be no way able to inferre it.

§. 60. The matter will be very viſible by *example* in any *Truſt*, or *Stewardſhip*. The *Lord* intruſts to his *Steward* the keeping of a

ſumme of money, after that he aſſignes it over to ſome other man by *Bill of Attorney*, and legally veſts his right in that other. In this caſe the *Steward* formerly intruſted *conſents*, that that other ſhall take what is thus by the *Lord* aſſigned to him, and indeed a neceſſity lies upon him *by way of duty* ſo to doe. In this caſe I ſhall ask M. *G. from whom* this money is *deriv'd* to this other? from the *Lord*, or from the *Steward?* I hope he will acknowledge from the *Lord*: The ſame againe, when the *King* delivers a Caſtle by way of Truſt, to be kept by one of his *Subjects*, and after aſſignes it over to his *Sonne*, and the *Subject* that kept it, *conſents* that the *Sonne* ſhould have it, and ſo the *Sonne* enters upon the *poſſeſſion*; the caſe is clear, that 'tis not from the *Subject* that the *Sonne* derives this *poſſeſſion* (though 'tis as true that the *Subject conſents* to deliver it up) but from the *King* onely: and that Act of the Subject is no expreſſion of any *right in him, from him conveyable to the Sonne*, but onely of his *Truſt, and ſubordination to the King*. And this is generally the difference betwixt *Inveſtitures* and *Truſts*: what is *veſted* in me, I may *give*, or *derive* to another, what is *intruſted* onely, I cannot: the Servant cannot diſpoſe of his *Maſters goods*, yet that his *Maſters diſpoſall* may ſtand good, he may, and ought to give his *conſent*. This is ſo groſſely true, that 'tis pitty any longer to inſiſt on it; and yet 'tis the very thing that the whole point in hand depends on, and was therefore, I conceive, ſo induſtriouſly involv'd, and obſcured by Mr. *Goodwin*.

§. 61. After this, Maſter *Goodwin* inſenſibly glides into another peice of artifice; *The power of life*, ſaith he, *is eminently and virtually in the people collectively taken, though not formally*. And againe, *A man, and a body of men, have power over their owne lives Radically, and Virtually, though not formally*. This period of Maſter *Goodwin* ſeemes to be a new way of *Anſwer*, by applying diſtinction to the *Antecedent*, as the former was by denying the *conſequence*. The *Antecedent* was [*That no man hath by nature the power over his owne life, &c.*] from whence the *Addreſſe* concludes that therefore [*This power cannot be diriv'd from the people*] To this Maſter *Goodwin* firſt returnes his acknowledgement, *That if the conſequence be right, it is a clear caſe, that Regall power is not originally in the people, but conferr'd on the Ruler immediately from God.*

God. This is an acknowledgement in him of the truth of the *Antecedent*, and a doubt onely of the *consequence*, which accordingly hē immediately proceedes to invalidate: And therefore 'tis a little strange (and an argument that his first attempt was not very *successefull* to him) that he should now so soone returne to deny the *Antecedent*, at least to *distinguish* of it, having before so *absolutely garnted it*. But to passe over this, and allow him this liberty of recalling his bounty, let us examine the force of his *distinction*.

§. 62. The force of this *distinction* doth not, I conceive, respect the *Subject* [*the people*] (as if that might be taken in two notions, either *singly*, or *collectively*) becaus presently, without that *distinction*, he speakes indifferently of [*A man*] and [*A body of men*] but it belongs to the *Copula*, or word [*Is*] and then it must be thus dissolv'd. *The power of life* may be said to be in a man two wayes, 1. *Formally*, 2. *Eminently* and *Virtually*, and *Radically*. This distinction of *Formaliter*, and *eminenter* hath been apply'd by *Philosophers* to the *Sun*, and *Heavenly Bodies*: of which it being by them resolv'd, that they are *simple* and free from those mixtures to which our *sublunary* bodies are subject, and yet it being apparent, that they *warme* and *heat* other things, it is thereupon defined, that they have not heat, or other qualities in them *Formally*, (*i. e.* in that manner, or kinde, that *fire* is *hot*, or we are *hot*) but *Virtually*, and *eminently*, *i. e.* that they have some other Virtue, or faculty in them, *higher*, or more *eminent* then that heat which is in *inferiour* bodies: and that that doth enable them to warme other things, though they are themselves such *pure* creatures, as not to have those grosse qualities in them. Whether this be rightly affirm'd, or onely *nicely conjectured* by *Philosophers* (for I suppose there is little known of those distant bodies beyond *conjecture*) I shall not now enquire, but onely desire to be taught by Mr. *Goodwin*, how this can be made appliable to the matter in hand, *i. e.* to *the power of life and death*. This *power*, we know, is in *God* first, and if in any *Eminently*, and *Radically*, and *Virtually*, certainly in *him*: And in the *Supreame* Magistrate *formally*, being actually inherent in him, though not *Originally*, nor in so *eminent* a degree as in *God* it is. But can it thus be said also to be *eminently*, &c. in the *People*, *i. e.* that the *People*

have in them ſome *higher*, and more *eminent Virtue*, or faculty then the *power* of every man over his own life; and that that ſupplies the place of that *formall* power, and that by it the *People* beget, or produce the *power of life* in the *Supream Magiſtrate*, as truly, as, if they had it *formally*, they could doe? This is the meaning of the diſtinction in the ordinary, and onely notion of it, and muſt be it, if it be rightly appliable; but Mr. *Goodwin* interprets his meaning of it, ſo farre from this, ſo farre from importing, or concluding the *People* to have ſuch an *higher* power or faculty (to which [*Eminently*] and [*Virtually*] in oppoſition to [*Formally*] belongs) that 'tis indeed by him ſet downe as much *inferiour* to that power *formally* inherent. For thus he interprets it, *A Man, and a body of Men, have power over their owne lives Radically, and Virtually, in reſpect whereof, they may render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes, which, if they violate, they muſt be in hazard of their lives, &c.* By this I diſcerne two things, 1. That by this *eminent, Virtuall, Radicall power*, Mr. *Goodwin* underſtands that (which is farre enough from the meaning of thoſe words, and) which Logicians call a *remote*, or *indirect power*, (as that is oppos'd to an *immediate*, or *direct*) or rather a *power*, to which this effect is meerly *accidentall*, as if the *patient* were ſaid to have power to cure himſelfe, meaning thereby that he hath power to *ſubmit* himſelf to the *Phyſitian*, who is able to cure him. And for Mr. *Goodwin* to aſſume the liberty of ſpeaking thus largely, was not, I ſuppoſe, his want of knowledge in propriety, but his willingneſſe to receive advantage from this abuſe of words: And then 2. If this be the onely meaning of the four hard words, (*Eminently, Virtually, Radically*, and *Formally*) *viz.* that 'tis *in the power of men* (or the *People* in community of nature) *to render themſelves to a Magiſtrate, and to Lawes, to which rendring 'twill be conſequent, that they ſhall hazard their lives upon violating thoſe Lawes*, then, I ſay, are Mr. *Goodwin*, and Doctor *Hammond* very well agreed; for this his explication of that diſtinction is very reconcileable with thoſe words of the *Addreſſe*. *This giving up their* (*i. e.* the peoples) *Liberties to one, or more, makes that man, or men, a Ruler over them, and being a Ruler, to him belongs* (*deriv'd from God, not from them*) *the power of life which Gods decree hath inſtated in the Supreame Power, or Ruler, who is therefore in*

that

that relation of avenger for wrath or puniſhment, a Miniſter of God, Rom. 13. *&c.* For whence is it that their rendring themſelves to a *Magiſtrate*, in Mr. *Goodwins* ſtile, brings upon them that *hazard of lives*, in caſe of violation of *Lawes*, unleſſe it be that he that hath power of their lives, placeth that *power* in that *Magiſtrate* to whom they have rendred, or ſubjected themſelves? That this is *God*, and not the *People*, I will not conclude to be Mr. *Goodwins* opinion, becauſe 'tis his maine deſigne to prove the contrary, but that thoſe words of his, and his diſtinction ſo explained will bear that ſenſe, I mean, that they will be true, and acknowledg'd by him, that acknowledges the *power of Life* to be onely in the *Supream Governour*, deriv'd from *God*, I conceive ſufficiently manifeſt; & conſequently, that though this power be ſaid to be in the *People remotely, improperly*, and *indirectly*, and ſo in Mr. *Goodwins* notion of *eminently, &c.* yet 'tis not from the *People*, but from *God* onely, that the Governour hath it.

§. 63. The reply will be as ready, and eaſie alſo to all force, or concludency of his next Argument, that which is taken from the Peoples power, to make, or *conſent to the making* of *Capitall Lawes*. For 1. Mr. *Goodwin* cannot be ignorant that it hath been ſometimes in the *power of Kings* to make Lawes, without the addition of any *conſent of the people*: ſuch were the *Principum placita* among the *Romans*: and after it was thought fit by *Princes* to lay ſome reſtraint on themſelves, both that they might be better adviſed, and more readily obeyed, then, though the *peoples conſent* hath been deem'd neceſſary, yet doth this belong onely to the *regulating*, and *modifying* the *exerciſe* of this power: the *Fundamentall power* it ſelfe *of life*, being in the *Supream Governour*, before the *making* theſe *Lawes*; Now 'tis very eaſie to diſtinguiſh betwixt theſe two, the *power*, and the *Regulating* of the *exerciſe* of that *power*; the *power* in the groſſe, and the *determination of that power* to this, or that particular action. The *interpoſition* of man in the latter of theſe, doth no way prejudge the ſole priviledge of *God*, in the donation of the former of them: As the *Grace* of *God* is his peculiar, and proper gift; and yet man may give *Directions*, and *Rules*, how we are to act by that *Principle*, what uſe it will beſt become us to make of that pretious *talent* entruſted to us. And therefore, for the great *Noon-day-Truth*

which Mr. *Goodwin* induceth from theſe, and the like conſiderations, *viz.* [*That men by nature have ſuch a power over their lives, as voluntarily,&c. to expoſe them to the ſtroke of publique juſtice, in caſe they ſhall offend, &c.*] This being granted, is of no force againſt Doctor *Hammond*, but doth with him rather ſuppoſe a *Publique Juſtice* able to ſtrike, *i. e.* a *power of life* already veſted in the *Magiſtrate*, before this *conſent* of the People, or abſtractedly, without reſpect unto it. And ſo ſtill it is not from this *conſent* of *the People*, that this *power* is deriv'd to the *hand of Publick Juſtice*, but from ſome other higher principle, *viz.* that of *God*, to whom ἐκδίκησις the *avenging*, or *puniſhing of offenders*, peculiarly belongs, and no other, but in ſubordination to, and ſubſtitution from him.

§. 64. And what if the *King*, as M. *Goodwin* next alledgeth, *have no power to take away the life of his Subjects without cauſe, or for every cauſe, but onely ſuch as by Law are puniſhable with death; What if he cannot command them to be their own Executioners?* Doth it follow from hence, that therefore, he hath the *power of life* from the *People*, not from *God*? Doth the *power of God* ſo conſiſt in doing *cauſeleſſe*, or *irrationall* things, that nothing which is exerciſ'd *moderately*, or *ordinately*, can be imagin'd to come from him? I ſhall ſuppoſe that *God himſelfe* hath perfect *dominion* over the world; and yet that he obſerves rules of *all-juſtice*, and *goodneſs* in the *exerciſe*, and *diſpenſing* of that *power*, and hath not *power* of doing any thing contrary to thoſe rules of *eternall Juſtice*; which he hath preſcribed to himſelf; which to do by all wiſe men hath been counted an act of *imbecility*, not of *power*. And conſequently, how naturall is it that he ſhould thus *determine*, and *limit* his deputies alſo? give them *power of life* over their *Subjects*, and yet command them to *exerciſe that power* with that juſt temperament, which either *naturall*, or *civill*, or *municipall Lawes* ſhall dictate, and preſcribe them? And therefore Maſter *Goodwins* arguing is very looſe, and unconcluding; [*That if the power which the King hath over the lives of the people, were immediately from God, then he might lawfully execute the ſame, and take away the lives of men, without any mediating direction, or warranty from any Law.*] For ſure the ſame God that gives the *Magiſtrate* the *power of life*, doth command him alſo not to throw away that pre-

pretious truſt cauſeleſly, makes him his *Miniſter for wrath to them that doe evill*, and contrary wiſe a *reWarder* to them that doe *Well*, and though he *ſubject* him not to any earthly *ſuperior*, but reſerve him to his own ſevere *tribunall*, yet he *ſubjects* him to *reaſon*, and *rules of Juſtice*, and (when he hath undertaken to governe by that Standard) to the *poſitive municipall Lawes* of that particular Kingdome alſo, and hath been as particular in preſcribing *Lawes* to the *Prince*, to avoid *Oppreſſion*, or *acts* of *Height*, as to *Subjects* to abſtaine from *reſiſtance*.

§. 65. As for that proofe which Mr. *Goodwin* produceth to enforce his arguing, *viz.* [*That the execution of no commiſſion immediately iſſued by God, ought to be ſuſpended upon, or determin'd, or regulated by any cõmiſſion, or conſtitution of men.*] It is as far from truth, as it could well have been contriv'd to be: As will appear if it be conſidered; that the word [Commiſſion] 1. ſignifies not an *abſolute*, or *poſitive Command*, but onely a *power*, or *inveſtiture* of *Authority*; or if a *Command*, yet that 2. onely an *Affirmative precept*, the nature of which is, that it binds not *ad ſemper*, and ſo conſequently, may be *ſuſpended* at ſome time, by the *free will* of him that hath the *Commiſſion*, much more if any weighty *reaſon* interpoſe to *determine* his *Will*. 3. That this *Commiſſion* is onely *Generall*, and *indefinite*, without application to particular caſes, referring that *application* to the *conjuncture* and *concurrence* of circumſtances, (which ordinarily are humane, and Politicall;) and conſequently to the *diſcretion* of *Rulers* judging by thoſe *circumſtances*: The intervenience of which circumſtances makes the particular *exerciſe* of that *Commiſſion* convenient, and ſeaſonable in one *place*, and at one *time*; and conſequently, where they do not intervene, there the exerciſe of it may be at that *time*, and *place ſuſpended* as unſeaſonable. As when the *ſhedder of blood* is by *God* commanded to be put to death, and yet ſome men accidentally, and invountarily fall under that Title, it muſt be in the *power* of the *Magiſtrate*, to *ſuſpend the execution* of that ſentence, or elſe the *Innocent* muſt looſe the benefit of the *Citty of refuge*, and run the ſame fortune with the moſt murtherous deſigner.

§. 66. After this manner 'tis clear, that *Chriſt* had a *Commiſſion* from heaven to worke *Miracles*, to cure *Diſeaſes*; yet 'tis particularly affirm'd of the *infidelity* of his Country-men, that that

ſuſpended

ſuſpended the exerciſe of his power for ſome time; *He could not doe many mighty works there becauſe of their unbelief*, yet, I hope, this will no way be thought to argue, that *Chriſts commiſſion* iſſued from his *Country-men*, or from the *belief of men*, (though that were neceſſary, to the exerciſe of it) or that *Chriſt* did ill in *ſuſpending the exerciſe of his Commiſſion*. In like manner the people of *Iſrael* had from *God* not onely a *commiſſion*, but *command* to put the *nations* to death, *Deut.* 20. 10. And yet on thoſe of them that were left, 1 *Kings.* 9. 20. *Solomon ſuſpended the act of that commiſſion*, and onely *levied a tribute of bond-ſervice* ver. 21. Once more; I ſhall ſuppoſe a *Generall* to receive power of *Martiall Law* from the Soveraigne in any Kingdome, this power he is not willing to exerciſe, but by a cognizance of each malefactors cauſe before a *Councell of Warre*. Here 'tis plain that that *Councell of Warre ſuſpends that exerciſe* of the *Generalls power* upon a particular man; but ſure it will no way follow from thence, that that *Commiſſion*, which was ſuppos'd to iſſue to the *Generall* from the *Soveraign*, doth now iſſue not from the *Soveraigne*, but that *Councell of Warre*; and then no more will the poſſibility of ſuſpending the *exerciſe* of the *Kings Commiſſion* by Law, &c. conclude that *Commiſſion* to iſſue from the *People*, and not from *God*. And therefore in the caſe which Mr. *Goodwin* hath been confident to referre to Doctor *Hammond* to Arbitrate [*Whether the King hath any Regular or juſt power over the lives of men, other then that which is proportion'd, &c. by the Lawes of the State*] I ſuppoſe the Doctor may agree with Mr. *Goodwin*, and yet never be enforc'd, or concluded by that conceſſion, to queſtion the *Originall* of the *power from God*, the difference being diſcernible between the *Power it ſelf*, and every particular *exerciſe of that power*; and the *ſuſpenſion* of the *latter*, farre from including the *evacuation*, or *cancelling of the former*.

§. 67. The ſame anſwer will clear Mr. *Goodwins* ſucceeding Plea, *pag.* 26. That if *the power of Kings over the lives of men, were by immediate derivation from God, then muſt this power be uniforme, &c. in all Kingdomes whatſoever.*] This *conſequence* is farr from all appearance of truth; Becauſe the power may be from *God*, and yet that *God* that *gives* the power, may leave it in the particular *exerciſes* of it, to be *determined* either by the arbitration,

tion, and free will, and prudence of the *Governour*, where there are no *Lawes*, or by the *Regulation of Lawes*, where there are ſuch; The *Dimenſum*, or *proportion of power over the lives of the Subjects*, which a *Governour* claimes, conſiſts not in *indiviſibili*, in any certain, or definite point, but is that which may enable him to diſcharge his office of *Ruler*, *i. e.* to *protect* his people, and reſtraine their inordinacies. And as farre as *Reaſon*, and (which are ſuppoſed to be a branch of that) *paticular Lawes*, (ſubordinate to Gods Word) ſee it fit to extend the *exerciſe of that power*, ſo far may that *Ruler* regularly extend it; And whatſoever *proportion* it be, that he is intruſted with by *God*, 'tis not reaſonable that he ſhould irrationally extend the *exerciſe* of it. And this *regulation* of *indefinite* power by ſuch prudent limits as theſe (*i. e.* by the *Univerſall* law of *Reaſon* and *Juſtice*, or by the particular concluſions, which the wiſdome of *Law-givers* hath thought fit to deduce from thence) cannot juſtly be quarrell'd, as a *retrenchment of power*, any more, then the infinite goodneſſe of God which permits him not to be able to do any thing which is contrary to that attribute, is a *manicling*, or reſtraining his *Omnipotence*, but is onely a cultivating and dreſſing of it, a *paring off the exceſſes*, and exorbitances of it, and leaving it a *form'd* channell, inſtead of a vaſt or *unbridled Ocean*.

§. 68. And thus I ſuppoſe the nature of *Angels* or men, which have bounds of *Virtue* and *Conſcience*, and *Lawes* preſcribed them, within which they are to move, and not to range unlimited in the deſert of their owne uncertain propoſals, cannot thereby be ſaid to have loſt the *liberty* of their *ſpecies*, or to have received *no powers* from *God* in their *creation*, though ſome *regulations* (it muſt be acknowledged) they are under, and conſequently, *determinations* and *ſuſpenſions for the exerciſe of their powers*. And what inconvenience the affirming of this will bring upon the *Doctor*, what *hazard of blaſpheming of God*, &c. I muſt profeſſe my ſelf ſo tame, as not to fore-ſee, or imagine, howſoever M. *Goodwins* ἀμετέλα ἀνδολικῆς hath helpt him to phanſie ſuch inviſible *Mormos*, and *Anakims* in our paſſage.

§. 69. Next, it is but *affirm'd*, and not at all made probable by Mr. *Goodwin*, that the *Affirming the Kings power over the lives of the people to be by immediate derivation from God, is to*

ſmite them with blindneſſe, &c. and *not to diſcover to them the Dan and Berſheba* (I ſuppoſe he meanes by this *trope*, the *due bounds and limits) of ſuch their power*] I am ſorry Mr. *Goodwin* ſhould think it fit that ſuch *popular harangues* ſhould be admitted to ſupply the place of *reaſon*, and ſhall briefly reply, That they that affirme the *power* of the *Sword* to be from *God* derived to *Magiſtates*, doe at the ſame time define, and affirme, that thoſe *Magiſtrates* are to remaine *rationall creatures*, and to continue under the *Soveraignty* of *Reaſon*, and all the branches of that, as farre as their particulars are concerned in it, *i. e.* to be ruled by the *Univerſall Lawes* of *Juſtice* and *Equity*, by the *Civill Sanctions* which tend to the preſerving of *Societies*, and conſequently by the *particular Locall*, or *municipall Lawes* of any Country, which are ſuppoſed to have a peculiar *propriety* toward the preſerving, and regulating of that *People*.

§. 70. 'Twill now be to little purpoſe to prove that theſe two affirmations are reconcileable, the one deriving the *power of life* to the *Ruler* from *God*, the other acknowledging the *regulation* of this power by theſe bounds; For there is no kind of repugnance, or contradiction, nothing but accord and amity between them: The very *Hand of God* that conferres this *power*, gives this very *direction*, and *Law* for the *exerciſe* of it, that they that rule other men ſhould themſelves be guided by *Reaſon* in all their actions: And what that *Reaſon* is in each particular emergent, they are not alwayes, or onely, the *Judicialls of Moſes*, which are fit to direct us, but the wiſdom ſometimes of *Particular Laws*, and *Lawmakers*. And ſo there is ſmall danger either of *enſnaring Kings*, or *diſturbing States*, (as he ſeemes willing to fear) *by this doctrine*; which though it define the *Originall* of this *power* to be from *Heaven*, can yet allow the *regulation of this power* for the *Exerciſe* of it to be of an *inferiour*, *Humane*, *Politicall Origination*.

§. 71. One Argument more Mr. *Goodwin* is pleaſed to take in to diſprove the *immediate derivation of this power of life from God*. Becauſe, ſaith he, that *derivation which is immediate from God, can by no wayes be aſſiſted, furthered, or promoted by any creature, or ſecond meanes, but this derivation of that power of life is at leaſt furthered by the act of the people in electing, &c. Ergo*, I ſhall not

not examine the force of his enſuing probations, which have frailties enough in them, but ſhall be content to ſuppoſe the moſt he can wiſh, or imagine, *viz.* That the people doe *elect*, or *chooſe* their *King*; In this caſe, ſaith the Doctor, *The people give not the power of their lives to that King, but by giving up their Liberties, &c. to him, nominate him to that office of ſupreame power, which, whereſoever it is, God ſuperinveſts with the power of life.* This is the *Doctors* ſtating of the queſtion in his *Andreſſe*, and thereby the ſeparation is evident between the *Act* of the *People* in *Electing the perſon* of the *Ruler*, and the *Act* of *God* in conferring this *power of life*. All that can be ſaid of the former of theſe is that that *act* of the *people* is the meanes of *determining* the *Generall decree of God* (that *Rulers* ſhall (as his *Deputies*) have the *power of life*) to this *particular* perſon, not that it is an *aſſiſtent*, or ſociall cauſe in conveying this power to the Ruler, much leſſe that it ſhall undertake to wreſt this *power* out of *Gods* hands, and aſſume it into their *owne*; but, I ſay, as a *cauſa ſine quâ non*, or a previous *preparation* of the ſubject, by their choiſe qualifying the perſon to be thus *inveſted*, and impower'd by *God*. And ſo, though the people in this caſe are ſuppoſed to doe ſomewhat, *i. e.* to *Elect*, and that *election* to *determine* this power of *Gods* to this perſon, yet is this *power* derived ſolely from *God*, as the *Addreſſe* hath ſufficiently explain'd, and not from any *act* of the *People*: And therefore the word [*Furthering*] in Mr. *Goodwins* Argument, may be taken (as an equivocall word) in a double ſence, either to denote *actuall aſſiſtance*, or contribution of force, or efficacy, toward the production of the effect, *viz.* of the *power of life* in the *Ruler*: And in that ſence it is not true, that the *Act of the People in Electing, doth further this power*, it being the ſole act of *Gods decree* to give that power, and nothing elſe. Or elſe the word [*Furthering*] may be taken to ſignifie no more then *preparing*, or *qualifying* the Subject to a capacity of receiving this *power* from *God*, (as *John Baptiſt* prepared mens hearts for the *receiving* of *Chriſt*, when he came, but had nothing to do in the *miſſion* of him, which was the ſole work of *God*) and thus indeed, the *Election of the People* may further the derivation of this power from *God* to ſuch a particular Ruler; And there is nothing more ordinary then for *Gods* workes to be thus *furthered* by ſecond cauſes, or meanes, even

his work of *Grace*, which he ownes moſt peculiarly. The reſemblance made uſe of in the Addreſſe, is very commodious to clear this whole matter. In the *Generation* of a child, the parents are acknowledged to contribute much, to be not onely *furtherers*, bnt even *efficients* in the production, Yet is it commonly agreed, that *God* creates, infuſes, and inſpires the Soul immediately. I need not examine, or atteſt the truth of the ordinary opinion, that the ſoule comes from *heaven*, not from the *Parents*; becauſe I now uſe it as a reſemblance onely, and that it may be allowed to be, though it ſhould not be true, and thus far at leaſt it will be *argumentative*, that the *electing* of the perſon of the *Ruler* by the *people*, doth no more conclude that the *power* of *life* is not ſuperinfuſed and derived to the *Ruler* (ſo choſen) from heaven, then the parents begetting of the child is an argument, that the *ſoule* is not ſuperinfuſed from *God*. Our *Phœnomena* may be all very happily ſolved by this way of ſetting it; and M. *G.* exceptions ſuperſeded, and the concluſion cleared, which was the onely one, which the *Addreſſe* deſired to infer by this conſideration, *viz.* That *Whatſoever were ſuppoſed of the peoples electing their Ruler, yet the Supream power neither is nor can be in the community of the people by force, meerly of their Originall, or naturall Liberty*, upon this firme ground (not yet ſhaken by M. *G.* or *Philodemius*) that the *power of life*, which is part of the *Supream Power*, is not part of the *naturall Liberty*, nor conſequently either inherent in the *Community of men*, nor by them communicable to any *Repreſentative*. ὅπερ ἔδει δεῖξαι, The onely thing, which this rejoynder (as the former diſcourſe) was deſigned to demonſtrate moſt irrefragably.

§. 72. And having proceeded thus farre to make returne to M. *Goodwins* offers of *reaſon*, I ſhall not endeavour to make payment to his *Scoffes*, pag. 28. or vindicate Doctor *Hammond* from his charge of *overweeningneſſe*, *&c.* Though 'tis not at all intelligible to me, how thoſe words in the *Addreſſe* (*For it is poſſible that I may put you in minde of an evident truth, which perhaps you have not taken notice of*] ſhould be chargeable with this οἰησιοφία, or interpretable to any farther ſenſe, then onely this, That this truth ſo evident in Doctor *Hammonds* opinion, was not by him conceived to be ſufficiently taken notice of, or laid to heart by them, to whom he then made his *Addreſſe*. And if that *Doctor*

were

were therein miſtaken, or if he be juſtly charged in his next page (together with the reſt of his perſwaſion, under the title *of the Whole Legion of the Royall Faction*) *as the firſt-borne of that evill Generation of Flatterers*, for producing plain Arguments of Reaſon, and Scripture to avert, that which appear'd to him a heavy Sinne, and Judgement, from a Nation; I muſt then betake my ſelfe to my *Prayers*, that *God* will forgive me my more diſcernible ſinnes, (when innocencies, and good offices to mankind are become ſo culpable) and get out of his company as ſoone as I can, who can ſo readily ſhift the diſcourſe from *reaſoning* to *defaming*, and ſupply with *reproaches* what was wanting in *Arguments*.

§. 73. I am now come to an end of this debate concerning the Power of life, but cannot be ſo prudent, or thrifty of my paines, as to diſſemble the other exceptions, which (in this book) Maſter *Goodwin* hath made to ſome other parts of the *Addreſſe*; I ſhall give you as briefe an account of them as is poſſible.

§. 74. The firſt, is his diſlike of t iat *Critick annotation*, as he ſtiles it, *of the Royall Doctor, taking notice that the Supream Power, or Ruler is ſtiled by the Apoſtle*, Rom. 13. *the Miniſter of God, and not of the people*] How this comes to be ſtiled a *Critick annotation*, (which ſuppoſes it a *Grammaticall* one, (as τεχνικὴ, ἐξηγητικὴ, κριτικὴ, are the parts *diviſive* of γραμματικὴ) where there is no uſe made of *Grammar* to deduce it, nor indeed of any thing but of the plaine words, as they lie in the Text) I have not the skill, or ſagacity to divine. All that Doctor *Hammond* affirmes is this, that the *Supream power*, Rom. 13. *is ſtiled by the Apoſtle, the Miniſter of God, and not of the people*. And is not this manifeſt to any that looks on *Rom.* 13.4. where he is twice ſtiled διάκονος Θεοῦ, *the Miniſter of God*, and is neither there, nor any where elſe ſtiled the *Miniſter of the People*. Vi. Moſchopul. Gram. Gr.

§. 75. But, ſaith M. *Goodwin*, *This no way infringes the credit of his concluſion, that Kings are the Servants and Miniſters of the People*. The *Apoſtles* were the *Miniſters of God*, *and yet they preach themſelves alſo the ſervants of Men*, 2 Cor. 4. 5. *and Miniſters of the Saints*, Rom. 15. 25. &c. To this I anſwer, that the phraſe διάκονος Θεοῦ, *Miniſter of God*, ſignifies a *Miniſter of Gods Ordination*, and *Inſtitution*, and though it may ſignifie ſomewhat

elſe, yet this is the onely notion wherein Doctor *Hammond* takes it in his *Addreſſe*, according to *Rom.* 13. of which he ſpeakes, where the *powers are ſaid to be ordained by God*, and to be his *Ordinance*. Now he that is thus a *Miniſter of God*, cannot be ſo alſo of the *People*, becauſe theſe two Ordinations being incompatible, he that holds by one, muſt needs diſclaime holding by the other. Another notion there may be of the phraſe, as it ſignifies *performing of ſervice to God*; and ſo indeed the ſame *Apoſtle* that *ſerves God*, may be a *ſervant of Men* alſo, and to that, all M. *Goodwins* probations are directed, and though S. *Paules* διακονῶν ἀγιοις, *his carrying of almes, and contributions to the poor Saints*, be no very proper inſtance to this purpoſe; yet thus 'tis acknowledg'd, that S. *Paul* may be a *ſervant of Men*, and performe offices of Humility to them, (though by the way this *Servant* of theirs behaves himſelf ſometimes very like a *Maſter*, and comes with a *Rod* when he ſees it convenient.)

§. 76. But this is nothing to the purpoſe to infer the *King* to be διακονος ἀνθρώπων, a *Miniſter of the People* in the former notion, *i. e.* a *Miniſter of the peoples Inſtitution*; and therefore all that M. *Goodwin* addes of the Reaſons why the *Ruler*, *Rom.* 13. is not called the *Miniſter of the people*, is very extrinſecall to that purpoſe. The utmoſt that he can enforce from that place is, that the *King attends on the publique good*. But ſure that will availe as little to prove that he is not a *miniſter of Gods inſtituting*, or one that hath the power from him, as the Shepheards waiting over the Flock, is a proof that he is *ordeined*, or *inſtituted* by his Sheep.

§. 77. The next undertaking of M. *Goodwin* againſt Doctor *Hammond*, is to prove that the *Civill Magiſtrate* is by S. *Peter* call'd ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις; which he renders the *Ordinance*, or *creature of Man, becauſe they receive their very being from the people as Kings, and as Magiſtrates*. Doctor *Hammond* hath, I conceive, ſufficiently vindicated that Text of S. *Peter* from this interpretation, and 'twere eaſie to ſhew, that the phraſe ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις muſt by all analogy be rendred *Humane creature*; not *Ordinance*, or *creature of Man*; by *humane creature*, meaning any part of mankind; by creature of man, a thing of mans creating. The phraſe to expreſſe the latter of theſe would be, κτίσμα ἀνθρώπου, taking

taking *Creature* for *production*, or *work*, and *Man* for the *artificer*, or *workman* of it; what is ſaid in the *Addreſſe*, is ſufficient to direct any ſober man to a right underſtanding of that place. And M. *Goodwins* exceptions are very farre from perſwading the contrary. As 1. [*That the King is there call'd Supream, not in reſpect of the community of the people, as*, ſaith he, *the Doctor ſuppoſeth, but as compar'd with ſubordinate Rulers.*] But this is of no force againſt the *Doctor* in that place, where all that he inferres from their title of *Supream*, is, that they are the very perſons that are enſtiled the *Ordinance of God, Ro.* 13. & that is the *ſignall character* which he mentions in that Text, without taking notice of any other aſpect of the word *Supream*, or drawing any nice concluſion from it.

§. 78. His ſecond exception is againſt the concludence of a *Negative Argument*. Which I acknowledge an exception ſo far as to keep that Argument from being demonſtrative, in caſe all the force of it were fetcht from the *Negative*; But that Argument from the *Negative* (or from the *Governours* not being ſaid to be *ſent by the people*) is but *præluſory* and preparative to another more forcible branch of the *Argument*, *viz.* that (on the contrary) *Supremacy* is affixt to the *King*, and *Subjection for the Lords ſake*, commanded to be paid him, (as *miſſion from him* is affirmed of all other *Magiſtrates*) And both thoſe put together, the *Kings being Supreme*, (i. e. inferior to none but God) and *Subiection* being affirmed to be due to him *for the Lords ſake*, (*i. e.* becauſe of the relation which he ſtands in to God, by whom he is ſaid to be ordained *Rom.* 13.) may well enough paſſe for a *character* of ſome remarke upon the *King*, and keeep the pretended rendring of ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, from being the neceſſary importance of that *text*, or the *Supreme* power from being concluded to be *originally in the people*.

§. 79. As for the *groaning of the creation, or creature*] *Rom.* 8. which Doctor *Hammond* renders [*the hope of the heathen world*] tis not all M. *Goodwins* σκιαμαχία that will render it an improbable interpretation. That the *Heathen world* (though *without hope*, *i. e.* in a deſperate condition in reſpect of ſalvation, as long as they remained in their idolatries) were yet ſo capable of receiving benefit of *Chriſts* coming into the world, that *Chriſt* is called *Deſiderium omnium Gentium*, *the deſire of all Nations*, in

Haggai

Haggai, and προσδοκία ἐθνων, *the expectation of the Gentiles*, in the Septuagints rendring of *Jacobs* Prophecie; that they seeing their owne impure condition, desired the meanes of *restoring* their lost treasure, and consequently are said to *desire Christ*, without explicit foreknowing any thing of him, (because that which they desired was no otherwise compassable, but by him) is no nicety of the Doctors invention, but largely insisted on by S. *Augustine* in his Bookes *De Civ: Dei*; and this one Consideration is Reply sufficient to all the inconveniences which M. *Goodwin* hath sprung in this interpretation.

§. 80. As for the other difficulties which to him seeme to presse and resist the interpreting of the following words to this sense, they are not so solemnly mentioned by M. *Goodwin* as to owne my impertinence, if I should enlarge on them; though I can assure him, that D. *Hammond* hath long since considered the whole Context, and is ready to give an account of the agreeablenesse of it to his present notion, whensoever it shall be seasonable. Only in favour to the Reader, he doth not unnecessarily obtrude it on him at this time, meaning to expect a fairer opportunity for that, and other the like dissertations.

§. 81. But M. *Goodwin* upon the granting of this notion of πᾶσα κτίσις, for the *heathen* world, hath falne upon a speciall κρησφύγετον, that however, *It signifies the world under the consideration of being the creature or creation of God.* And then he wonders why ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις should not signifie the *Magistrate to be the creation of man, and how by this interpretation that conclusion of the Kings being the creature of the people, is avoided.* To this I answer punctually, that M. *Goodwin* being the affirmer of this doctrine, [*That the King is the creature of the people*] and his proofe of it being those words of Saint *Peter*, where *obedience* is commanded to be paid πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει, as tis by him rendred, *to every creation*, or *ordinance*, or *creature* of man, It is certainly sufficient for D. *Hammond* (to disprove this conclusion so inferred from that place of Saint *Peter*) if he shall be able to mention another probable interpretation of those words, from whence that *Conclusion* will not be inferr'd; especially if by other places of Scripture he make it manifest, that that interpretation is most agreeable to the analogie of that and other *Scriptures*. Now this

this hath D. *Hammond* done, by ſhewing that πᾶσα ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις is a phraſe which needs not ſignifie any more then *every man, or humane creature*, not onely *Chriſtian*, but *Gentile*, or Heathen alſo. Which if it be the entire notation of the phraſe (as at this time M. *Goodwin* is content to grant) then ſure is there no ground for him from thence to conclude, that the *King* is ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις in that other ſo diſtant ſenſe, *an ordinance or creature of the people*. As long as M. *G.* concluſion depends upon that *one* onely notion of the phraſe, ſo long, unleſſe that be ackuowledged the genuine ſenſe of it, (as certainly tis not, when another ſo diſtant from that, is ſuppoſed poſſible to be it) there is no ſtability to be expected to that concluſion, whoſe premiſſes are thus forfeited by his own *conceſſion*.

§. 82. As for the *Doctors* Anſwer to the ſuppoſed Objection, (where by the parallel *command of honouring all, ver.* 17. he infers the limitation of the ſubject, *All to whom honour belongeth* there, (*i.e.* ſuperiors, not inferiors) and ſo here, *every humane creature*, (*i. e.* every ſuch, that is in place of *Magiſtracie*) certainly M. *G.* hath failed much in his attempt to invalidate it, by affirming that that *Apoſtle*, in his *command to honour all, ſuppoſeth a debt of honour due from every man to every man, according to that of the Rom.* 12.10. *In honour preferring one another*. For to this I anſwer, that the meaning of 1 *Pet.* 2. 17. cannot ſure ſo properly be feteht from *Rom.* 12. 10. as it may from the circumſtances of the Text and verſes on each ſide of it in the place of S. *Peter*. In the former verſes, 13. and 14. the words clearly refer to the doctrine of *obedience to Superiours*, and ſo *ver.* 15. the mention of *Gods will* [that *by well-doing we ſhould put to ſilence the ignorance of fooliſh men*] (*i. e.* that by obeying of our *Superiours* we ſhould take off the Scandall that lay on *Chriſtianity*, as if it made men *ill Subjects*, *ver.*16.) doth plenarily belong alſo to the ſame matter. So again, *honouring the King* in the end of the 17.*ver.* and *ſervants obeying their Maſters*, *ver.*18. are very forward to concurre with this notion; And the precept of *loving the brotherhood*, i. e. their *fellow-Chriſtians*, and of *fearing God*, (from which *feare* the *honour* divolves upon his Vice-gerent) will no way prejudice this notion of the *honour* there ſpoken of, that it belongs onely to the debt of *inferiours* to *ſuperiours*; and ſo that the [*All*] are onely thoſe *all* that are thus capable of it.

§. 83. As for the *honouring* of *Widowes* (by Master *Goodwin* mention'd from Saint *Paul* to *Timothy*) that sure is not appliable to this matter, since the *honour* there, is the *relieving*, or feeding of them, giving them that *honour of supply*, which is acknowledged to be another notion of the Word, not that which in the fift *Commandement*, and those other places, is the principall importance of it.

§. 84. As little reason hath Mr. *Goodwyn* to conclude that the precept of *being Subject one to another*, 1. *Pet.* 5. 5. should not be a precept of *obedience* to *Superiors*, when the words immediately precedent are, *Likewise ye younger submit your selves to the Elders*, and those *Elders*, *ver.* 2. the ποιμαίνοντες & ἐπισκοπῶντες, the *Pastors and Bishops of the Church*. 'Tis possible indeed, that the [*one another*] may be, *Others* beside *Superiors*, but sure tis not so probably so, when that which immediately precedes, is *Submission* to *Elders*, to which the subjection here added, is not a phrase of *diminution*, but of *addition* rather, and when *God is resisting the proud*, that immediately followes, is, saith Saint *Augustine*, (as in the Poet, *debellare superbos*) the direct contrary to *Subjects parcere*, the giving *pardon*, or *grace* to the *obedient Subjects*. And thus I conceive the parallel words of Saint *Paul*, *Eph.* 5. 21. *Submitting your selves one to another*] are most probably to be interpreted, to those among you who are in any relation of *superiority*, for so it followes immediately, *ver.* 22. *Wives submit your selves to your own husbands*, &c. Whereas, when he returnes to the *husbands duty* toward the *wife*, it is not *submission* but *love* only, *v.* 25. Other places I might easily mention, where the word (ἀλλήλους) may very well signifie no more then *others*. So the ἐξομολογεῖσθε ἀλλήλοις τὰ παραπτώματα, *confesse your faults one to another*, *Jam.* 5. 16. cannot farther be extended then to a direction to the *sick* to make *confession of his sins*, whether to *others simply*, or to those *others* whom he hath *injur'd*, but obligeth not them that are in *health* to *confesse their sins reciprocally* or back againe to the sick, and so in the next words [*and pray* ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων, *for one another*] that is, that the brethren in health should *pray for them that are sick*, and not *reciprocally* that the *sick* should *pray* for them in *health*, the end of the prayer there mention'd being ἵνα ἰαθῆτε, *that ye may be healed*; which end, and close doth, I conceive, confine

fine the diſcourſe to the *ſick* firſt to *confeſſe*, and to the *healthy*, after to *pray* for the *ſick* and no more. And ſo φιλόξενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους, 1 *Pet.*4.9. notes *hoſpitality* to the *ſtrangers* that wanted, and not *mutuall*, *reciprocall entertainments* one of the other: For though it is poſſible that it might note the inhabitants civility to the *travailer* firſt, and then that *travailers* repayment of the like, when he comes to be a fixt *inhabitant*, yet the word ξένοι, *ſtrangers*, being ordinarily taken as a *ſpecies* of men in *want* (as beſides ſome places of Scripture, I remember in *Juſt: Mar: ſecond Apolog:* ſpeaking of the *offertory*, he ſaith that by that meanes *the Præfect became the guardian of ſtrangers, &c. and of all that were in want*) I conceive φιλόξενοι is no more then *kind* to that ſort of *poore ſtrangers*, and that without any expectation of being *entertain'd* by *them againe*, for that the *Almes-giver* ſhould expect that returne from the *poore*, or *ſtranger*, is both *unreaſonable* and *unchriſtian* alſo. So *Luke*.12.1. καταπατεῖν ἀλλήλους cannot be taken reciprocally, that they which *trod* on others were alſo *trod* upon by them, but that *one trod upon another* agreeable to our preſent ſenſe: ſo *Act.*7.26. ἵνα τί ἀδικεῖτε ἀλλήλους; not that the perſon *injur'd* was *injurious* alſo, but onely that *one injur'd the other*. And yet more plainly, *Rom.*2.15. *their thoughts excuſing or accuſing*, μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων, where it cannot be imagined that the thoughts *mutually* or reciprocally *accuſe* or *excuſe*, the *accuſation* belonging *to the conſcience*, which *accuſeth* the erronious *will*, but not in like manner to the *will*, that that ſhould *accuſe* the *Conſcience*. Theſe places are added *ex abundanti*; That of *Epheſ.* 5. will be able alone to ſerve the turne, if theſe others ſhould not be thought to be *demonſtrative*. I have thus briefly reply'd to theſe other exceptions of Mr. *Goodwin* as far as concernes that Place in Saint *Peter*, and I ſuppoſe have vindicated it from being the foundation of Mr. *Goodwins* beloved *dogma* (which I ſhall deſire him to ſhew to be the affirmation of any one ancient Father or Commentator on that place, or of any one place of Scripture beſides, which might helpe to countenance it) that *Kings are the creatures of the people*.

§. 85. There are yet ſome old reckonings which Mr. *Goodwin* is willing to make even with the *Doctor*, and I muſt beg a very Little patience from the *reader* to obſerve what *account* he hath given of them.

§. 86. He begins with fair words of D. *H.* and acknowledgments, that *having frequently heard of him, he never heard any thing but well and worthy of a man, his judgement in the grand ſtate-queſtion of the times onely excepted.* That the diſcharge of his *Conſcience* in obedience to the fift *Commandement* ſhould be thus made an exception againſt the *Doctor*, he hath ſure learnt μὴ ξενίζεσθαι neither to think *ſtrange*, nor take ill at M. *G.* hands, remembring that ſome of the *Chriſtians* which were antiently in the world, in the abſence of other viſible crimes, were thought worthy of all reproaches for their *common* profeſſion, or being *Chriſtians*. One thing onely I ſhall ſuppoſe, I have the *Doctors* leave to aſſure M. *G.* that it was no ſpeciall *deſire to engage* M. *G.* which cauſed the particular mentions, and refutations of ſome paſſages in his bookes, but onely the opinion which he had, that they might probably prove matter of *ſeduction* to the reader (and that ſeduction of a dangerous conſequence) if ſuch neceſſary antidotes were not provided to *avert*, or *prevent* the *danger*. D. *H.* I ſuppoſe, is not over-fond of ſuch diſputes, or debates as theſe, and is never more in conſtraint, then when he lies under ſuch engagements.

§. 87. Some paſſages in M. *G. Butchers bleſſing* were a firſt great temptation to him, which, though reſiſted by the love of quiet, prepared him to receive more violent impreſſions from ſome remarkable ſections in the *Anticavaleiriſme*, And at laſt the fire kindled, and his pen gave teſtimony of it.

§. 88. The particulars he then took notice of in M. *G.* were 1. His dexterities in evacuating the force of *Tertullians* teſtimonies concerning the *patience*, and non-reſiſtance of the *Primitive Chriſtians*, and theſe are at large refuted in the tract of *Reſiſting* &c. pag. 10. to pag. 20. Secondly, his ſtrange affirmation of *Gods hiding from the firſt Chriſtians this liberty of reſiſting Superiours, as part of his counſell to bring Antichriſt into the world, and his manifeſting it to us now, as a meanes of caſting Antichriſt out.* The latter of theſe two, D. *H.* conceived as ſtrange, and as dangerous a Doctrine, as he ever met with, and therefore examined it to the *bottome*, *Reſiſt.* pag. 21. to 28. Theſe two maine matters of difference D. *H.* acknowledges to have managed againſt M. *G.* but I conceive without any thing of *aſperity*, or *exceſſe* in any

any kind, which ſhould look like a *particular deſire of engaging* M. *G.* And M. *G.* hath thought fit for many yeares to let theſe reckonings ſleep without ever giving the leaſt reply to either of them. And now that [*of Gods hiding of truths from the Ancient Chriſtians*, and the *helping Antichriſt to his throne*] hath not the fortune to be taken notice of at all. And for the other of *Tertullian*, though that be now mentioned, yet is it a little ſtrange that no other return ſhould be made to all the *Doctors anſwers*, ſave onely the tranſcribing of two or three pages from M. *Rutterford*, and M. *Pryn*, as from a paire of *Royaliſts*, in their two tracts of *Lex Rex*, and *Soveragine power of Parliaments*, which ſure he could not believe will be of any Authority with the *Doctor*, though he is ſo pleaſant as to mention the *friendlineſſe of their judgements, and the Doctors in caſe of the late King*: Beſide this *tranſcription*, there is but one paſſage in thoſe diſſertations of the *Doctors*, to which he thinkes fit to make reply, and that is a *Grammaticall* σχάλμα, taken notice of παρέργως by the *Doctor*, *viz.* M. *G.* attributing to *Montaniſt*, that he call'd himſelfe the *holy Ghoſt*. This D. *H.* did conceive to be haſtily written by M. *G.* and not agreeably to the rules of the *Grammer*, unleſſe as in *Smectymnus*, *Areopagi*, are ſet for the *Areopagites*, ſo *è contra*, *Montaniſt* were ſet by M. *G.* for *Montanus*. In this caſuall incidentall charge M. *G.* thinks himſelfe very neerly concern'd, more it ſeems, then in giving account either of his *Cenſure of Tertullians teſtimony* of the *Chriſtians patience*, or of *Gods hiding of Truths*, and *aſſiſting Antichriſt*. For to juſtifie the *Grammaticalneſſe* of theſe words, [*Montaniſt who called himſelfe the holy Ghoſt*] a great deale of paines is taken, and three whole pages ſpent on that affaire. Tis not poſſible I ſhould think fit to exerciſe my Reader by continuing ſuch a *Debate* as this any longer, but ſhall think it abundantly ſufficient to aſſure M. *G.* that the Engliſh remaines ſtill unjuſtified, upon this ground, that the word *Montaniſt* is no *poſſeſſive*, and if he ſtill have inclinations to diſpute it, I ſhall propoſe him this parallel: M. *Goodwin* is *a Chriſtian, who dyed for the ſons of the world*, and aske him, Whether it be *Grammaticall* ſenſe to have ſaid this. As for the deep recrimination againſt D. *H.* for uſing the word [*Reſolve*] for *concluding*, or *being ſatisfied within himſelfe*, *&c.* if this be any matter of *eaſe* on

refreſhment to M. *G.* 'twere pitty he ſhould be denyed the *liberty* to make uſe of it.

§. 89. There now remaines but one particular, the Doctors *accuſing* *M.* G. *of flattery* in the Elogies beſtowed upon that action of the Army, (collected in the *Addreſſe*, p. 6.) Whether they were thus guilty, I ſhall no farther diſpute, but leave it to the *Reader* to determine, having no other deſigne in this whole *Reply*, then that M. *G.* may reſume the conſideration of his actions, and of his arguments, and remember that the matters of theſe debates, are of ſuch an importance toward the publike peace, that men of our *profeſſion* owe an account to *God* for them. And for other paſſages of this *Author*, wherein the *London-Miniſters* are concern'd; I leave them to anſwer for themſelves, and ſo conclude this Paper.

THE END.